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CHANGING WITH THE TIMES:                                                                                                  
EMINENT DOMAIN PRACTICE IN LIGHT OF TENNESSEE PUBLIC ACT 863 
SCOTT GRISWOLD* 
 The practice of eminent domain in Tennessee has recently undergone a 
variety of fundamental changes.  The catalyst for these changes was the controversial 
United States Supreme Court decision of Kelo v. City of New London.1  In response to 
this landmark decision, the Tennessee legislature revised a number of laws designed 
to clarify and “shore-up” the state‟s takings provisions.2  This Article will introduce 
this new legislative scheme to practitioners and provide advice on how to bring and 
defend condemnation proceedings. 
 Part I of this Article analyzes the Kelo decision and its impact on Tennessee 
law.  Part II highlights the most significant changes from the 2006 legislative session.  
Part III explores the constitutional requirements, source and scope of eminent 
domain powers, pleadings‟ requirements, condemnation of leasehold estates, the 
Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, and professional responsibility issues.  Part IV 
provides a practical guide of how to initiate and defend eminent domain proceedings 
in light of these statutory changes.  Part V provides a brief conclusion.  Finally, Part 
VI of this Article provides a series of sample pleadings, pre-trial motions, and lease 
clauses. 
I.  THE CATALYST:  KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON 
In the recent controversial eminent domain case of Kelo v. City of New London¸ 
Justice Stevens stated, “nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing 
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”3   In response to this 
invitation from the United States Supreme Court, the Tennessee General Assembly 
                                                 
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Chief Justice William M. Barker of the Tennessee Supreme Court; J.D., 
The University of Tennessee College of Law, 2007; B.B.A., Middle Tennessee State University, 2003.  
I would like to thank Professor George W. Kuney for his insightful comments and guidance.   
1 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
2 See 2006 Tenn. Pub. Acts 863. 
3 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. 
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enacted Public Act 863 and affected over twenty statutory provisions of Tennessee‟s 
eminent domain laws.4   
 The changes to the eminent domain laws in Tennessee can be categorized 
into four major areas:  (1) establishing a clear legislative intent concerning when the 
government is permitted to use eminent domain; (2) defining certain elements of this 
area of law; (3) changing condemnation procedures; and (4) removing eminent 
domain power from certain agencies, subdivisions, and other groups.  In taking on 
this comprehensive legislative endeavor, the General Assembly did not merely limit 
itself to the challenges and questions raised by Kelo, but also addressed obsolete areas 
of the law, such as abolishing provisions for public mills‟ takings powers in 
Tennessee.  This legislative effort garnered broad bipartisan support from both rural 
and urban lawmakers, and the result, hopefully, is a more concise and predictable 
takings jurisprudence. 
A.  The Facts 
 Before analyzing and exploring Tennessee‟s new eminent domain laws, it is 
important to understand what prompted these changes.5  In June of 2005, the United 
States Supreme Court issued its decision in Kelo v. City of New London.6  In an effort to 
reduce the federal military budget, the Department of Defense closed the Naval 
Undersea Warfare Center (the “Center”) and laid off approximately 1,500 civilian 
employees.7  The closing of the Center, located in the Fort Trumbull area of New 
London, Connecticut (the “City” and “State,” respectively), exacerbated the City‟s 
decade-long economic decline and led State and local leaders to declare it a 
“distressed municipality.”8  In response, the State and City targeted the Fort 
Trumbull area for economic revitalization.9  To accomplish its goal, the City 
reactivated the New London Development Corporation (“NLDC”), a non-profit 
entity previously established to assist the City in economic revitalization.10  In 
                                                 
4 2006 Tenn. Pub. Acts 863. 
5 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469. 
6 Id.  
7 Id. at 473.  
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
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conjunction with the NLDC and the State, the City developed a plan to reinvigorate 
the area by turning Fort Trumbull into a state park.11  Shortly after this plan was 
announced, Pfizer, Inc. unveiled its plans to build a new $300 million research and 
development complex adjacent to the newly designated state park.12   The NLDC 
devised a revitalization plan to capitalize on Pfizer‟s announced plan, and various 
local and state leaders approved the NLDC‟s plan.13  
 The Fort Trumbull revitalization plan divided the targeted area into seven 
parcels.14  A new “waterfront conference hotel at the center of a „small urban 
village‟” would be constructed on the first three parcels.15  Parcel 4, which 
encompassed Ms. Kelo‟s property, was subdivided into two sections; Parcel 4A 
would either serve as a parking lot or as building space for retail shops, and Parcel 4B 
would have a new marina and part of the riverwalk erected on it.16  Additional office 
sites, retail building sites, and parking would be constructed on Parcels 5, 6, and 7.17  
The overarching goal of the revitalization plan was to use the land more effectively 
to create jobs, increase tax revenues, “make the City more attractive[,] and to create 
leisure and recreational opportunities on the waterfront and in the park.”18  The City 
approved the final plan in January of 2000 and designated the NLDC as the 
development agent in charge of implementation.19  The City also delegated its 
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 Id.  Pfizer, Inc. is a large and well-known pharmaceutical company.  Id.   
13 Id. at 473-74. 
14 Id. at 474. 
15 Id.  According to the NLDC‟s plan, the “small urban village” would be comprised of restaurants 
and shopping areas, public and commercial marinas, a riverwalk, residences, a museum, and office 
space.  Id.    
16 Id.  The proposed retail shops would capitalize upon the foot traffic attracted by either the 
proposed park or the marina.    
17 Id.  
18 Id. at 474-75. 
19 Id. at 475. 
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eminent domain powers to the NLDC, which successfully acquired most of the 
necessary property.20   
 Susette Kelo purchased her quaint pink cottage in 1997 and refused to sell to 
the NLDC.21  In all, nine property owners who owned fifteen properties in the 
development area refused to sell their properties to the NLDC.22  The NLDC did 
not assert that these properties were “blighted or otherwise in poor condition,” but 
sought them solely because “they happen[ed] to be located in the development 
area.”23  Ms. Kelo and her neighbors challenged the NLDC‟s condemnation of their 
homes in New London Superior Court claiming that the proposed taking of their 
properties violated the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.24  While litigation was pending before the trial court, the NLDC 
agreed to long term leases “of the parcels with private developers in exchange for 
their agreement to develop the land [in accordance with] the revitalization plan.”25  
After a seven-day bench trial, the New London Superior Court issued a 
permanent restraining order prohibiting the Parcel 4A takings but allowing the 
condemnation of Parcel 3.26  Both parties appealed.27  The Connecticut Supreme 
Court concluded that the takings were authorized under existing state law and 
overturned the trial court‟s permanent injunction.28  The court relied upon a statute, 
that read:  “the taking of land, even developed land, as part of an economic 
development project is a „public use‟ and in the „public interest.‟”29  To further 
                                                 
20 Id.   
21 Id.   
22 Id.   
23 Id.   
24 Id.   
25 Id. at 476 n.4. 
26 Id. at 475-76. 
27 Id. at 476. 
28 Id.   
29 Id. (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 515-521 (2004)). 
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bolster its decision, the court relied upon the United States Supreme Court‟s 
decisions in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff30 and Berman v. Parker31 for the 
proposition “that such economic development qualified as a valid public use under 
both the Federal and State Constitutions.”32  The United States Supreme Court 
granted Ms. Kelo‟s petition for certiorari to determine “whether a city‟s decision to 
take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies the „public use‟ 
requirement of the Fifth Amendment.”33  
B.  The Majority’s Decision 
Justice Stevens authored the majority‟s decision and began by laying out what 
this case did not involve.  He explained that it is well-settled that a state may not 
seize A‟s property for the sole purpose of giving it to B, even though A is justly 
compensated.34  In addition, it is axiomatic that a state may take property from A and 
transfer it to B if future “use by the public” is the purpose of the condemnation, 
such as condemning land for a common carrier railroad.35  Moreover, the Kelo case 
does not exemplify a state seizing land to make it open to the public.36  Accordingly, 
Justice Stevens reasoned that this case must be analyzed under the previously 
adopted theory that “public use” means “public purpose.”37  The majority opined 
that “[w]ithout exception, our cases have defined [public purpose] broadly, reflecting 
our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in [the takings] field.”38  
                                                 
30 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
31 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).  
32 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 476 (citing Kelo, 843 A.2d at 527). 
33 Id. at 477. 
34 Id.   
35 Id.   
36 Id. at 478. 
37 Id. at 480. 
38 Id.  
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 Justice Stevens began his analysis of “public purpose” by reviewing the 
Berman v. Parker decision.39  In Berman, the United States Supreme Court upheld a 
Washington, D.C. redevelopment plan that called for the condemnation of a large 
blighted area.40  Under the plan, the majority of the condemned land would be used 
for building streets, schools, and public facilities; the remainder would be sold to 
private developers for redevelopment, including development of low-income 
housing.41  The owner of a non-blighted business located within the redevelopment 
area challenged the plan and argued that the “creation of a „better balanced, more 
attractive community‟ was not a valid public use.”42  In rejecting the owner‟s claim, 
the Court deferred to the legislature and refused to address each property on an ad 
hoc basis.43  The Berman Court stated that:  
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the 
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as 
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. . . .  If those who 
govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation‟s Capital 
should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth 
Amendment that stands in the way.44  
 Next, the majority analyzed its decision in Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff.45  In Midkiff, the State of Hawaii had a stagnate land market resulting from a 
small number of landowners owning a majority of Hawaii‟s private lands.46  The 
Hawaii legislature concluded that this land oligopoly was “skewing the State‟s 
residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility 
and welfare,” so the legislature enacted a redistribution plan whereby land was taken 
                                                 
39 Id. (discussing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)). 
40 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. 26). 
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 481 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 31). 
43 Id.  
44 Berman, 348 U.S. 26, at 31-33. 
45 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482 (discussing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)). 
46 Id. at 499 (O‟Connor, J., dissenting). 
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from the land barons and sold on the open market.47  Reaffirming Berman’s deference 
to the legislature, the Midkiff Court held that Hawaii‟s goal of eradicating the “„social 
and economic evils of a land oligopoly‟ qualified as a valid public use.”48  Moreover, 
the Midkiff majority explained that the State‟s immediate transfer of land from one 
private individual to another did not lessen the “public purpose.”49  Instead, courts 
should focus on the purpose of the takings, rather than their mechanics.50 
 In a subtle reversal of roles, the Kelo Supreme Court‟s more liberal bloc 
opined that it had “wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of 
affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use 
of the takings power.”51  Justice Stevens observed that the City‟s determination that 
the Fort Trumbull area needed to be economically revitalized was entitled to judicial 
deference, despite the fact that it was not a blighted area.52  The City responded to a 
legitimate threat in a calculated and deliberate manner.53  It enacted its revitalization 
plan in accordance with a specific grant of legislative authority to use eminent 
domain to achieve its goal.54  Given the Supreme Court‟s long history of legislative 
deference in takings jurisprudence, the majority found that the City‟s redevelopment 
plan and its subsequent takings served a constitutionally appropriate “public 
purpose.”55 
 Lastly, Justice Stevens emphasized that the states are free to place additional 
restrictions on the exercise of takings power.56  He noted that some states already 
                                                 
47 Id. (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232). 
48 Id. at 482 (majority opinion) (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241-42). 
49 Id.  
50 Id. (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232). 
51 Id. at 483. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 483-84.  
55 Id. at 484. 
56 Id. at 489. 
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have provisions–either in their state constitutions or eminent domain laws–that 
would prevent a similar taking.57  Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court 
determined that its authority extended only so far as to decide whether the City‟s 
redevelopment plan fit within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment.58  As such, the 
wisdom of using eminent domain for economic development properly remains 
within the confines of the elected representatives.59 
C.  Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence 
Justice Kennedy is emerging as an important swing vote whose opinions 
have become increasingly important as his support becomes critical for parties to 
prevail in certain instances.  Takings jurisprudence may be one of those instances.  
While Justice Kennedy joined in the majority‟s overall conclusion, he offered insight 
as to the situations in which he would find a taking for economic development 
unconstitutional: 
A court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause 
should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to 
favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual 
public benefits, just as a court applying rational-basis review under 
the Equal Protection Clause must strike down a government 
classification that is clearly intended to injure a particular class of 
private parties, with only incidental or pretextual public 
justifications.60 
Justice Kennedy observed that the trial court thoroughly reviewed the City‟s purpose 
for condemning Ms. Kelo‟s property and determined that the City did not condemn 
her property to benefit any particular person.61  Specifically, the trial court found that 
the City executed the taking to benefit from Pfizer‟s presence, not to benefit Pfizer.62 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 489-90. 
59 Id. at 489. 
60 Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
61 Id. at 492. 
62 Id. 
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 Ms. Kelo argued that takings justified by economic development should be 
“per se invalid or, at least presumptively invalid.”63  Justice Kennedy responded that 
such a strong rule was unnecessary in most instances and would render too many 
valid takings unconstitutional.64  While he disagreed with the property owners‟ 
argument in this particular instance, he believed that an instance where per se or 
presumptive invalidity should attach could occur.65  Justice Kennedy conjectured that 
“[t]here may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible 
favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) 
of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause.”66  Unfortunately for Ms. 
Kelo and the other property owners, Justice Kennedy found that “[w]hile there may 
be categories of cases in which the transfers are so suspicious, or the procedures 
employed so prone to abuse, or the purported benefits are so trivial or implausible, 
that courts should presume an impermissible private purpose, no such circumstances 
are present in this case.”67  
D.  Justice O’Connor’s Dissent 
Justice O‟Connor dissented, arguing that the majority‟s opinion erodes the 
protections of the Public Use Clause to such a miniscule level as to essentially 
eviscerate that Clause from the Fifth Amendment.68  The crux of Justice O‟Connor‟s 
dissent is that the government “cannot take [petitioners‟] property for the private use 
of other owners simply because the new owners may make more productive use of 
the property.”69  Justice O‟Connor began by recognizing that the Fifth Amendment 
places two distinct restraints on the government before it can seize private property:  
“the taking must be for a „public use‟ and „just compensation‟ must be paid to the 
owner.”70  Taken in tandem, these clauses “ensure stable property ownership by 
                                                 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 493. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 494 (O‟Connor, J. dissenting). 
69 Id. at 496. 
70 Id. (quoting Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003)). 
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providing safeguards against excessive, unpredictable, or unfair use of the 
government‟s eminent domain power–particularly against those owners who, for 
whatever reasons, may be unable to protect themselves in the political process 
against the majority‟s will.”71  Justice O‟Connor reminded the majority that fairness 
and security underlie the Takings Clause.72  
 In breaking with the majority‟s central premise that the Supreme Court 
should give deference to the legislature, Justice O‟Connor opined that legislatures are 
not the “sole arbiters of the public-private distinction.”73  As such, courts must serve 
as a check on the powers of the legislature to protect the ability of the Public Use 
Clause to limit the government‟s eminent domain powers.74  Furthermore, to protect 
the bedrock principle that a state cannot seize property from one citizen merely to 
transfer it to a second citizen, the Supreme Court has consistently reserved “a role 
for courts to play in reviewing a legislature‟s judgment of what constitutes a public 
use . . . .”75  In reexamining Berman and Midkiff,76 Justice O‟Connor looked to the 
evils that the District of Columbia and Hawaii evaluated.77  In both of those 
decisions, the legislatures reacted to affirmative harm–blight and land oligopolies–
and determined that the most effective cure was to take the extraordinary step of 
seizing land from one property owner and transferring it to another.78   In contrast to 
Ms. Kelo‟s situation, the elimination of the affirmative harm in Berman and Midkiff 
was the public purpose.79  
 
                                                 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 497 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg‟l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336 
(2002)). 
73 Id. at 497. 
74 Id.   
75 Id. at 500 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. V. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,  240 (1984)).  
76 J. O‟Connor authored the Midkiff majority opinion.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 231. 
77 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O‟Connor, J. dissenting).  
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
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E.  Justice Thomas’ Dissent 
Staying true to his originalism theory of constitutional interpretation, Justice 
Thomas dissented and bemoaned yet another example of the Supreme Court moving 
farther away from the Framers‟ original intent.80  Under Justice Thomas‟ reading of 
the Public Use Clause, the government may seize property “only if the government 
owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the property, as opposed to taking it for 
any public purpose or necessity whatsoever.”81  In reviewing the constitutional text‟s 
history, Justice Thomas argued that “the Takings Clause authorizes the taking of 
property only if the public has a right to employ it, not if the public realizes any 
conceivable benefit from the taking.”82  Since the Public Use Clause is a restraint, not 
a grant, of power, the government “may take property only when necessary and 
proper to the exercise of an expressly enumerated power.”83  Justice Thomas called 
for a reconsideration of the Supreme Court‟s rote reliance on decisions, specifically 
Berman and Midkiff, that detract from the Constitution‟s original meaning.84  
II.  THE RESPONSE:  TENNESSEE PUBLIC ACT 863 
In response to Kelo, on June 6, 2006, Governor Phil Bredesen signed Public 
Act 863 (the “Act”) to conclude more than a year of legislative wrangling in the area 
of eminent domain.85 The Act begins with a reaffirmation that Tennessee‟s 
Constitution, in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 
protects the right of an individual to own property and to be free from capricious 
and arbitrary takings of that property by the government.86  The remainder of Part II 
of this Article highlights the significant changes in Tennessee law resulting from the 
Act.   
 
                                                 
80 Id. at 506 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
81 Id. at 508. 
82 Id. at 510. 
83 Id. at 511. 
84 Id. at 519-21. 
85 2006 Tenn. Pub. Acts 863. 
86  Id. 
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A.  Preamble 
After reaffirming its belief in the rights of the individual to own property, the 
legislature restricted the powers of the State and its political and administrative 
subdivisions to condemn property only when the condemnation was performed in 
harmony with the Federal and State Constitutions, the Act, and other eminent 
domain laws.87  The initial statutory addition proclaims the lawmakers‟ intent that 
“the power of eminent domain shall be used sparingly, and that laws permitting the 
use of eminent domain shall be narrowly construed so as not to enlarge by inference 
or inadvertently the power of eminent domain.”88  This new preamble requires that 
courts applying this statute do not liberally construe the eminent domain powers to 
allow a taking that is beyond the narrowly vested powers of the government.  
B.  Definitional Changes 
The next significant change was the legislature‟s attempt to “shore–up” 
definitions to ensure that a Kelo-type taking could not occur in Tennessee.  One of 
the primary shortcomings of Tennessee‟s takings jurisprudence was the lack of 
statutory definitions for “eminent domain” and “public use.”  In addressing these 
concerns, the General Assembly responded by defining “eminent domain” as:  
the authority conferred upon the government, and those entities to 
whom the government delegates such authority, to condemn and 
take, in whole or in part, the private property of another so long as 
such property is taken for a legitimate public use in accordance with 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, Article I, Section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution, and 
the provisions of this [A]ct.89   
This definition allows the government to delegate its eminent domain power to other 
entities, such as housing authorities or development corporations.  
 The General Assembly negatively defined “public use” by stating that 
“„public use‟ shall not include either private use or benefit or the indirect public 
benefits resulting from private economic development and private commercial 
                                                 
87 Id.  
88 Id. § 1 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-101 (2005)). 
89 Id. (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(a) (2005)).  
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enterprise, including tax revenue and increased employment opportunity . . . .”90  
Essentially, the General Assembly turned takings jurisprudence on its head and 
effectively foreclosed the possibility of an outright Kelo condemnation in Tennessee.  
The statute does allow condemnation powers in Tennessee to be used in five discreet 
areas,91 in which takings have traditionally been upheld both by the United States 
Supreme Court and the Tennessee Supreme Court. 
First, a government may condemn land for the most obvious purpose of 
eminent domain pure public use.92  The government may seize an interest in real 
property for the construction of roads, highways, bridges, public facilities, or other 
forms of public transportation.93  This area of eminent domain jurisprudence is fairly 
well settled, and even the most stalwart strict constitutional constructionists would 
have difficulty arguing that building a road is not for “public use.”  
Second, condemnation is allowed in “common carrier” takings.  Here, the 
government may acquire “any interest in land necessary to the function of a public or 
private utility, a governmental or quasi-governmental utility, a common carrier, or 
[entities holding the eminent domain authority].”94  Generally, these takings are 
justified on the premise that the public is the primary beneficiary.  For example, the 
local power company generally has the ability to exact an easement from a property 
owner to run a power cable across the land.  
Third, housing authorities or community development agencies may invoke 
condemnation proceedings to cure blighted areas as part of an urban renewal or 
redevelopment plan as authorized by statute.95  Such was the case in Knoxville’s 
Community Development Corp. v. Wright.96  In Wright, the City of Knoxville, through its 
agent Knoxville‟s Community Development Corporation (“KCDC”) and pursuant 
to a redevelopment plan, authorized the condemnation of certain blighted areas near 
                                                 
90 Id. (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(b)).  
91 Id. (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(b)(1)-(5)). 
92
 Id. (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(b)(1)). 
 
93 Id.  
94 Id. (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(b)(2) (2005)).  
95 Id. (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(b)(3) (2005)).  
96 Knoxville Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Wright, 600 S.W.2d 745 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). 
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the Fort Sanders community.97  The plan called for KCDC to acquire blighted land 
either through purchase or condemnation with just compensation.98  After the land 
was developed, it was to be sold for fair market value to a local developer for further 
commercial development.99  However, the property owners refused to sell, and 
KCDC filed condemnation proceedings.100  The property owners argued, inter alia, 
that the condemnation was unconstitutional because the private developer was the 
primary beneficiary.101  The court of appeals rejected the property owners‟ argument 
and found that under the approved redevelopment plan, private, yet blighted, 
property could be condemned and resold to a private individual to develop the 
condemned land in accordance with a redevelopment plan.102  
Fourth, a government may seize property even if a private individual receives 
an incidental benefit.103  However, the government cannot invoke condemnation 
proceedings if the taking is “primarily for the purpose of conveying or permitting 
such incidental private use.”104  For example, the local airport authority may seize 
lands to build an airport and lease space inside the airport to a private individual to 
operate a food court.  Because the airport authority‟s primary purpose was to build 
an airport and not benefit the food court operator, the food court operator‟s 
beneficial private use is merely incidental and permitted. 
Lastly, counties, cities, and towns may acquire property through eminent 
domain for an industrial park authorized by the Industrial Parks Act (“IPA”).105  The 
Act adds a new subsection to the IPA limiting the government‟s exercise of its 
                                                 
97 Id. at 746-47.  The City of Knoxville proposed the revitalization plan in preparation for the 1982 
Knoxville International Energy Exposition.  Id.   
98 Id. at 747. 
99 Id. at 749. 
100 Id. at 747. 
101 Id. at 749. 
102 Id. 
103 2006 Tenn. Pub. Acts 863, § 1 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(b)(4) (2005)).  
104 Id. (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(b)(4) (2005)).  
105 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-16-201 (2007); 2006 Tenn. Pub. Acts 863 § 1 (amending TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 29-17-102(b)(5)(2005)).  
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eminent domain powers to within its jurisdictional boundaries or within an urban 
growth boundary.106  Additionally, the government may not invoke the power of 
eminent domain unless it was unable to obtain the property, or any comparable 
alternative property, after undertaking “good faith negotiations.”107  
In addition to defining “eminent domain” and “public use,” the General 
Assembly also responded to a strong Tennessee Farm Bureau Federation lobbying 
campaign to clearly delineate what constituted a “blighted area.”  Prior to the Act, 
“blighted areas” were defined as:  
areas (including slum areas) with buildings or improvements which, 
by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty 
arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, 
excessive land coverage, deleterious land use, or obsolete layout, or 
any combination of these or other factors, are detrimental to the 
safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community.108   
To clarify and limit this grant of power, the General Assembly defined “welfare of 
the community” to exclude a decrease in property value to surrounding properties or 
the need for increased tax revenues as the sole reasons for condemning land as 
blighted.109  Moreover, the legislature emphatically stated that land used 
predominately for agricultural purposes could not be considered as blighted under 
any circumstances.110  
While these new definitions add clarity and limitations, it remains to be seen 
how effective they will be in protecting property owners.  For example, the new 
definition of “blighted areas” remains vague enough to allow a Kelo-type taking in 
                                                 
106 2006 Tenn. Pub. Acts 863 § 3 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-16-207(e) (2005) (current 
version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-16-207(f) (2007)); see also TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-58-101 to 107 
(2005) (outlining comprehensive growth plans).   
107 2006 Tenn. Pub. Acts 863 § 3 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-16-207(e)(2) (2005) (current 
version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-16-207(f)(2) (2007)).  “Good faith negotiations shall be 
established, if the city or county has made an offer to purchase the property for an amount equal to or 
in excess of the fair market value, determined by the average of at least two (2) appraisals by 
independent, qualified appraisers.”  TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-16-207(f)(2).  
108 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (2005) amended by 2006 Pub. Acts 863, § 2.  
109 2006 Tenn. Pub. Acts 863, § 14 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (2005)).   
110 Id. (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (2005)). 
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Tennessee.  A city could argue that an inner-city block riddled with crime and 
poverty is “detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community”111 
and should be condemned and transferred to a developer who can build an upscale 
residential village in the area, thereby increasing safety.  The developer and city rely 
on increased safety rather than decreased property values or increased tax revenues.  
Furthermore, under the new definition for “welfare of the community,” decreased 
property values or increased tax revenues cannot be the sole reason for the taking, but 
they may be a reason.  Considering that poverty stricken neighborhoods are often 
the least politically influential, it is not difficult to recognize the shortcomings of the 
Act.  While the Act addresses some of the deficiencies in this area of law, it may be 
viewed as a minor step and as nothing more than a “feel good” political ploy that 
does little to protect property owners in Tennessee.  
C. Procedural Changes 
In addition to changes in the Public Use Clause and definitional sections, the 
Act also changed the procedural mechanism to condemn property.  A new section of 
the Tennessee Code Annotated provides that any government holding the power to 
condemn and seeking to condemn property must provide the property owner at least 
thirty days notice before undergoing any additional steps.112  Moreover, if the 
property owner is unknown, a non-resident, or cannot be found, then the 
government may give notice by publication in the same manner as is customarily 
done in chancery court.113  If the property owner fails to challenge the taking, the 
government shall have the right of possession of the property or property rights 
being sought.114  On the other hand, if the property owner challenges the taking 
within thirty days, the trial court shall determine, as a matter of law, whether the 
government has the right to seize the property.115  If the government prevails, it shall 
then have the right to take possession.116  Lastly, if the government does have the 
right to possession and the property owner refuses to comply with the 
condemnation proceedings, the court must issue a writ of possession to the local 
                                                 
111 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (2007)). 
112 Id.  
113 Id. at § 15(a).  
114 Id. at § 15(b)(1). 
115 Id. at §15(b)(2). 
116 Id.  
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sheriff to put the government in possession.117  The writ of possession can be issued 
before a trial on the damages.118 
The Act now mandates the calculation of total damages for completely 
condemned property.119  This figure shall not be less than the property assessor‟s 
valuation immediately before the condemnation “less any decrease in value for any 
changes in such parcel occurring since the valuation was made, such as the removal 
or destruction of a building, flooding, waste, or removal of trees.”120  In addition to 
the immediately past property assessor valuation, the parties must obtain an appraisal 
of the property.121  The appraisal report must include the property‟s best and highest 
use, the current use of the property at the time of the proceeding, and a description 
of “any other use to which the property is legally adaptable at the time of the 
taking.”122  The appraiser must be designated a Member of the Appraisal Institute or 
be licensed and qualified under the State Licensing and Certified Real Estate 
Appraisers Law.123 
Similarly to the definition changes, the General Assembly began correcting 
some of the problems with calculating damages in eminent domain proceedings; 
however, it failed to see the changes through to fruition.  Because of the difference 
of opinions and benchmarks used by property assessors, the new procedural 
requirements for property assessments may lead to more laborious litigation over the 
appropriate value of the property.  In addition, utility companies may be forced to 
acquire a “full blown” appraisal even when they are seeking only a partial taking.  
The new statutory scheme will likely be a boon to appraisers and significantly 
increase the costs of partial takings for utilities.  Given the disparate interests, the 
lack of clarity from the legislature has the potential to spawn additional acrimony 
among the litigants.  
                                                 
117 Id.  
118 Id.  
119
 Id. at § 19 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-114(a)(2) (2005)). 
 
120 Id.  The parties may enter the valuation of the property into evidence at trial.  Id.  
121 Id. at § 20.  
122 Id.  
123 Id.; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-39-101.  
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Finally, the General Assembly attempted to clarify how courts should tax 
costs to the parties.  The clerk shall tax the government with the costs in three 
circumstances:  (1) “[t]he amount of damages awarded at trial exceeds the amount 
assessed by the condemnor and deposited with the clerk;” (2) “[t]he condemnation is 
abandoned by the condemnor;” or (3) “[t]he final judgment is that the condemnor 
cannot acquire the property or property rights by condemnation.”124  On the other 
hand, the costs are levied against the property owner “if the amount of damages 
awarded at trial does not exceed the amount assessed by the condemnor and 
deposited with the clerk.”125  If the government fails at the condemnation 
proceeding, either because it abandons the eminent domain action or is adjudged to 
be unable to condemn the property, the court shall require that the government 
reimburse the property owner for his reasonable expenses, including reasonable 
attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees.126 
D.  Eliminating Eminent Domain Powers 
Finally, the Act eliminated power from certain regional authorities and other 
political and administrative subdivisions.  Under the amended laws, the Sequatchie 
Valley Planning and Development Agency,127 the Tennessee River Four County Port 
Authority,128 the Tennessee Duck River Development Agency,129 the Chickasaw 
Basin Authority,130 public mills,131 and incline railroad corporations132 can no longer 
use eminent domain to acquire land.133  In addition, the General Assembly abolished 
                                                 
124 2006 Tenn. Pub. Acts 863, § 24(a)(1)(A)-(C). 
125 Id. at § 24(a)(2).  
126 Id. at § 24(b).  
127 Id. at § 7 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-1-503(14) (2005)).  
128 Id. at § 8 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-4-106 (2005)). 
129 Id. at §  5 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-1-603(3) (2005)).  
130 Id. at §  6 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-1-204(15) (2005)).  
131 Id. at §  11 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-6-118(a)(9) (2005)).  
132 Id. at § 13 (repealing TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-18-101 (2005)).  
133 Id. at §§ 5-8, 11, 13. 
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the counties‟ authority to seize natural lakes or land to construct lakes134 and to 
condemn land for creating ferries.135 
E.  Summary 
The General Assembly used the Kelo decision as a catalyst to change how the 
Tennessee government interacts with property owners.  This legislative endeavor 
united lawmakers from both political parties with a common goal of protecting 
property owners from arbitrary and capricious condemnation of a citizen‟s most 
precious rights.  As with all legislative undertakings, the new laws are not perfect, and 
the courts will be called upon to settle many upcoming disputes.  However, these 
new laws will significantly clarify and limit the government‟s ability to seize a citizen‟s 
property. 
III.  SCOPE AND SOURCE OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN TENNESSEE 
Eminent domain is the right or power to take private property for 
public use; the right of the sovereign, or of those to whom the power 
has been delegated, to condemn private property for public use, and 
to appropriate the ownership and possession thereof for such use 
upon paying the owner a due compensation.136   
This inherent right remains subject to two significant limitations:  (1) the taking of 
property must be “for public use,” and (2) it can only be invoked upon payment of 
“just compensation.”137  The subtleties of this jurisprudence have been a source of 
conflict between property owners and the government since the early days of the 
republic.  The conflict draws into contrast two fundamental principles of democratic 
government:  the right of the property owner to be secure in his possessions and the 
right of the government to ensure the tranquility and efficient operations of the 
community.  Since these two competing principles must survive within the confines 
of our communities, it is imperative that attorneys understand the delicacies of 
eminent domain and how to balance the needs of the individual with those of the 
community.  
                                                 
134 Id. at § 10 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-22-101 (2005)).  
135 Id. at § 9 (repealing TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-11-302 (2005)).  
136 City of Knoxville v. Heth, 210 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tenn. 1948) (quoting 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 
1); accord Jackson v. Metro. Knoxville Airport Auth., 922 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Tenn. 1996).  
137 Heth, 210 S.W.2d at 328. 
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The power of eminent domain is predicated upon the belief that “[t]he 
possibility that one‟s property may be taken for public purposes is a limitation upon 
every citizen‟s ownership of his property.”138  It is a power of practical necessity that 
must work in harmony with the ideals of organized society and serve as a means to 
accelerate an escheat back to the State.  The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution embodies this theory and attempts to balance it 
with the right of private ownership by mandating that “nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”139  These twin restrictions of public 
use and just compensation are incorporated to the states through the 14th 
Amendment.140  Similarly, article 1, section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution requires 
“[t]hat no man‟s particular services shall be demanded, or property taken or applied 
to public use, without the consent of his representatives, or without just 
compensation being made therefor.”141  Thus, if the government condemned a 
person‟s property, regardless of its character,142 for a non-public use or without just 
compensation, the property owner would be deprived of due process of law and his 
or her fundamental constitutional rights. 
 The power of eminent domain is a dormant right which can only be 
exercised by a state with legislative action.143  Upon confronting a situation in which 
eminent domain may be needed, the General Assembly must declare the purpose for 
invoking the condemnation powers and who is empowered to wield it.  The 
legislature has the option of either enacting a provision that specifically identifies the 
property to be condemned and the compensation to be paid or passing an enabling 
statute that delegates the eminent domain powers to an agent.144  If the General 
                                                 
138 Harper v. Trenton Hous. Auth., 274 S.W.2d 635, 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954). 
139 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). 
140 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (citing Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)). 
141 TENN CONST. art. 1, § 21; see also Harper, 274 S.W.2d at 641. 
142 Duck River Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Manchester, 529 S.W.2d 202 (Tenn. 1975) (stating 
that “constitutional prohibitions against taking private property without just compensation applies 
[sic] with full force and validity to personal property” just as they do to real property); see also Betty v. 
Metro. Gov‟t of Nashville & Davidson County, 835 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tenn. 1992).  
143 County Highway Comm‟n of Rutherford County v. Smith, 454 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1969).  
144 Rivergate Wine & Liquors, Inc. v. City of Goodlettsville, 647 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tenn. 1983); State 
v. Oliver, 35 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tenn. 1931); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Proffitt, 903 S.W.2d 309, 314 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).  
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Assembly transfers its powers of eminent domain to an agent, the agent has broad 
discretion “„in determining what property is necessary for public purpose, with 
respect to the particular route, line, or location of the proposed work or 
improvement, and . . . the courts will not disturb their action in the absence of fraud, 
bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion.‟”145  
 Since the use of eminent domain is in derogation of private property rights, 
the agent‟s actions will be scrutinized to ensure the agent does not act beyond the 
scope of the enabling statute.146  Likewise, the enabling statutes will be construed 
liberally in favor of property owners‟ rights.147  In the preamble to the eminent 
domain laws, the General Assembly emphasized its desire for strict construction of 
eminent domain statutes.148  Accordingly, courts should ensure that when property is 
seized in the public‟s name, the seizure was for a “public use” and upon the payment 
of “just compensation.”  However, courts should also remember that the “possibility 
that one‟s property may be taken for public purposes is a limitation upon every 
citizen‟s ownership of his property.”149 
 While eminent domain protects the individuals‟ right to compensation when 
the government takes his property, not all governmental impairment of value is 
compensable.  Under a state‟s general police powers, the state has the power to 
adopt regulations or ordinances to promote the public health, safety, and welfare.150  
The police powers have “generally not been considered to amount to a taking under 
the power of eminent domain . . . .”151  Thus, when an act of police power, as 
                                                 
145 Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 903 S.W.2d at 311-12 (quoting 26 AM. JUR. Eminent Domain § 113); see also 
Williamson County v. Franklin & Springhill Tpk. Co., 228 S.W. 714, 719 (Tenn. 1921) (stating that it 
is well settled that “in the absence of a clear and palpable abuse of power, the determination of the 
necessity for the taking and what property shall be taken is not a question for the judiciary, but for the 
legislature or the body to whom the right of eminent domain is delegated by it”).  
146 Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 903 S.W.2d at 312. 
147 Id. 
148 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-101 (2007).  
149 City of Maryville v. Edmondson, 931 S.W.2d 932, 935 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Harper 
v. Trenton Hous. Auth., 274 S.W.2d 635, 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954)).  
150 Hoover, Inc. v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals for Davidson County, 955 S.W.2d 52, 53 n.2 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1997).  
151 Draper v. Haynes, 567 S.W.2d 462 (Tenn. 1978).  
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opposed to eminent domain, causes the impairment, the decrease in value is not 
compensable.152  For example, the courts have deemed “the imposition of housing 
regulations, the imposition of zoning regulations, the imposition of utility rate 
regulations; the changes in streets abutting property from two-way streets to one-way 
streets; inconvenience, noise, and dirt from construction of a public improvement 
which interfered with the use of property;” and an annexation by a city that 
interfered with a private contract non-compensable.153  
 The distinction between decreases in value from police powers and from 
eminent domain is a murky and controversial topic within takings jurisprudence.  
This is especially true in light of the increasing prevalence of municipalities which 
have “imposed land use regulations upon private property instead of using limited 
public funds to acquire private property for public use.”154  The United States 
Supreme Court first addressed this issue in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.155  In this 
seminal case, Justice Holmes enunciated the standard for establishing a “regulatory 
taking” when he wrote that “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”156  The Tennessee Supreme 
Court has yet to formally adopt the Pennsylvania Coal Co. test; however, the court of 
                                                 
152 JAMES L. MURPHY, III, EMINENT DOMAIN IN TENNESSEE . . . AN ATTORNEY‟S GUIDE 3 (Dennis 
Huffer ed., Mun. Technical Advisory Serv. 2004) (1992). 
153 Id.; see also City of Clarksville v. Moore, 688 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tenn. 1985) (finding enforcement of 
housing code not compensable); Draper, 567 S.W.2d at 465 (finding a zoning ordinance an exercise of 
police powers and not a constitutional violation); Ledbetter v. Beach, 421 S.W.2d 814, 814, 819 (Tenn. 
1967) (concluding that noise, creation of dirt and dust, and “general impairment of private use” of 
property caused by construction is not compensable); City of Memphis v. Hood, 345 S.W.2d 887, 894 
(Tenn. 1961) (concluding that changes in traffic and street is not compensable); Hudgins v. Metro 
Gov‟t of Nashville & Davidson County, 885 S.W.2d 74, 76-77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that 
providing services for free which another party was under contract to provide its customers was not a 
taking); In re Billing & Collection Tariffs of S. Cent. Bell, 779 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) 
(finding that regulation of rates by utility company is not unconstitutional); Ambrose v. City of 
Knoxville, 728 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that lawful diversion of traffic is not 
an illegal taking). 
154 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 3. 
155 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  
156 Id. at 415. 
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appeals has employed its rationale numerous times.157  The intricacies and scope of 
regulatory takings are beyond the scope of this article. 
III.  LIMITATIONS UNDER TENNESSEE LAW 
A. “Public Use” 
 The first constitutional limitation on the sovereign‟s right to seize private 
property is that the taking must be “for public use.”  While at first glance this may 
appear plain and unambiguous, this limitation has become one of the most litigated 
questions in eminent domain jurisprudence.  The Tennessee Constitution states 
“[t]hat no man‟s particular services shall be demanded, or property taken, or applied to 
public use, without the consent of his representatives, or without just compensation 
being made therefor.”158  Whether a taking constitutes a public use is “a „judicial 
question, confided by the people to their courts, to insure a practical enforcement of 
this constitutional guaranty to the citizen.”159  However, courts have given significant 
weight to the state‟s, or the state‟s agent‟s, determinations of public use because 
those determinations relate to matters that “should and must have been known by 
the legislative branch.”160 
In City of Knoxville v. Heth, the Tennessee Supreme Court was forced to 
ascertain whether the City of Knoxville‟s condemnation of a building was a public 
use when it was acting in its proprietary capacity rather than its governmental 
capacity.161  The Heth Court looked at the distinction between private and public 
corporations and noted that “[t]he test of public use is not based upon the function 
or capacity in which, or by which, the use is furnished.  The right of the public to receive 
and enjoy the benefit of the use is the determining factor whether the use is public or private.”162  
Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that the condemnation satisfied 
                                                 
157 See Far Tower Sites, LLC v. Knox County, 126 S.W.3d 52, 69 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Rives v. City 
of Clarksville, 618 S.W.2d 502, 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Bayside Warehouse Co. v. City of 
Memphis, 470 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971).  
158 TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (emphasis added).  
159 City of Knoxville v. Heth, 210 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tenn. 1948).  
160 Id.  
161 Id. at 329.  
162 Id. (quoting Light v. City of Danville, 190 S.E. 276, 286 (Va. 1937)).  
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the “public use” requirement because the public would enjoy the benefits of the 
building through increased efficiency and it was essential to the city to have the 
additional building.163  Moreover, the Tennessee Supreme Court expressly stated that 
it adopted a “practical view of the meaning of „public use.‟”164 
The scope of the phrase “public use” is incapable of precise delineation and 
must remain elastic to keep pace in a changing society.165  The Tennessee Supreme 
Court has opined that: 
Moreover, views as to what constitutes a public use necessarily vary 
with changing conceptions of the scope and functions of 
government, so that to-day [sic] there are familiar examples of such 
use which formerly would not have been so considered. As 
governmental activities increase with the growing complexity and 
integration of society, the concept of “public use” naturally expends 
in proportion.166 
B. “Just Compensation” 
 Although the government must have a legitimate public use for seizing a 
citizen‟s property, it must also pay the property owner just compensation for the 
property.167  Tennessee courts have consistently held that the government may satisfy 
this requirement by paying the property owner the fair market value on the date of 
the taking.168  Additionally, the General Assembly has decreed that “[i]n all instances 
the amount to which an owner is entitled shall be determined by ascertaining the fair 
cash market value of the property or property rights taken and adding to the same 
the amount of incidental damages . . . .”169  Fair market value “is that value which 
                                                 
163 Id. at 330.  
164 Id.  
165 Id.  
166 Id. (quoting Dornan v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 200 A.2d 834, 840 (Pa. 1938)). 
167 TENN. CONST. art. I, § 21.  
168 Nashville Hous. Auth. v. Cohen, 541 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tenn. 1976); State ex rel. Comm‟r of the 
Dept. of Transp. v. Williams, 828 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). 
169 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-910 (2007); State ex rel. Comm‟r of the Dept. of Transp. v. Brandon, 
898 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).  
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might be derived if a party is willing to sell but does not have to sell, a piece of 
property, and a party who is willing to buy, but he does not have to . . . buy the 
property.”170  The amount of damages awarded for just compensation is a question 
of fact,171 and the parties are entitled to a trial by jury.172  If the condemnor is entitled 
to condemn the property, the property owner carries the burden of establishing the 
fair market value of the seized property or property rights.173 
1.  Fair Market Value   
The trier of fact must determine the value of the property at the time of the 
taking and cannot consider evidence of “the enhancement in value or depreciation in 
value of the property that occurred before the taking in anticipation of the 
completion of the public improvement . . . .”174  In Layne v. Speight, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court‟s description of this 
“scope of the project” rule:   
[I]f a distinct tract is condemned, in whole or in part, other lands in 
the neighborhood may increase in market value due to the proximity 
of the public improvement erected on the land taken. Should the 
Government, at a later date, determine to take these other lands, it 
must pay their market value as enhanced by this factor of proximity. 
If, however, the public project from the beginning included the 
taking of certain tracts but only one of them is taken in the first 
instance, the owner of the other tracts should not be allowed an 
increased value for his lands which are ultimately to be taken any 
more than the owner of the tract first condemned is entitled to be 
allowed an increased market value because adjacent lands not 
                                                 
170 Davidson County Bd. of Educ. v. First Am. Nat‟l Bank, 301 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tenn. 1957); accord 
Brandon, 898 S.W.2d at 226; Alloway v. City of Nashville, 13 S.W. 123, 124 (Tenn. 1890).  
171 Strasser v. City of Nashville, 336 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tenn. 1960); see also Davidson County Bd. of 
Educ., 301 S.W.2d at 911; State ex rel. Pack v. Hill, 408 S.W.2d 213, 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).  
172 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-107 (2007).  
173 Williams, 828 S.W.2d at 402; Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Ryan, 393 S.W.2d 3, 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1964).  
174 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 16 (citing Layne v. Speight, 529 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tenn. 1975)).  
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immediately taken increased in value due to the projected 
improvement.175 
This type of situation generally arises when a large scale government improvement 
project is subdivided into multiple smaller projects.  If the property increases in value 
because of the improvement and the government later decides to seize additional 
property, then the property owner is entitled to the enhanced value unless the “lands 
were probably within the scope of the project from the time the [g]overnment was 
committed to do it.”176  “The rule does not require a showing that the land ultimately 
taken was actually specified in the original plans for the project.  It need only be 
shown that during the course of the planning or original construction it became 
evident that land so situated would probably be needed for the public use.”177  When 
confronted with this situation, the trial court must determine, as a threshold matter, 
the probable scope of the project “which will serve as the basis for the admissibility 
of comparable sales that might reflect the appreciation.”178  
 In addition to excluding enhancement values, the trier of fact cannot 
consider either previous asking prices by the owner179 or offers by potential buyers180 
in ascertaining the targeted property‟s fair market value.  The Tennessee Supreme 
Court reasoned that “[i]f persons could prove the value of their lands [by introducing 
previous offers or potential offers], nothing would be easier than to prepare for the 
controversy by having offers made through friendly parties having no real purpose to 
buy.”181  Even if the property owners could establish that the offers were bona fide, 
                                                 
175 Layne, 529 S.W.2d at 212 (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1943)).  
176 Id. (quoting Miller, 317 U.S. at 377); see also State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. v. Harvey, 680 S.W.2d 792, 
794 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).  
177 Layne, 529 S.W.2d at 213 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 21 (1970)).  
178 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 16 (citing Layne, 529 S.W.2d 209; State ex rel. Comm‟r of Dept. of 
Transp. v. Veglio, 786 S.W.2d 944 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)).  
179 Lewisburg & N. R.R. Co. v. Hinds, 183 S.W. 985, 996 (Tenn. 1916); Vaulx v. Tenn. Cent. R.R. Co., 
108 S.W. 1142, 1148 (Tenn. 1908); see also Town of Milan v. Thomas, 178 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1943) (reaffirming the rule in Vaulx, but finding that the admission of previous offers was 
harmless error considering that previous offer was consistent with other testimony concerning the 
value of the condemned land).  
180 Vaulx, 108 S.W. at 1148.  
181 Id.  
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the court believed that such evidence and the incumbent questions surrounding the 
good faith nature of the offers would be “disastrous to the sound administration of 
justice in cases of this character.”182 
 Moreover, the trier of fact may neither consider speculative values to new 
owners in assessing fair market value,183 nor may it base an award solely on the 
targeted property‟s “highest and best use.”184  In Layne, the state supreme court 
stated that Tennessee adheres to the majority rule “that just compensation must be 
measured by the fair market value of the land in view of its value for all available uses 
as distinguished from its value for the best use.”185  The General Assembly appeared to 
codify this rationale in a new provision to the eminent domain laws requiring that the 
condemning authority obtain an appraisal of the targeted property.186  Under this 
provision, the appraiser must consider the targeted property‟s “highest and best use, 
its use at the time of the taking, and any other uses to which the property is legally 
adaptable at the time of the taking.”187  Accordingly, the property owner will not be 
allowed to introduce evidence of the value or loss of value of the targeted property 
for a specific purpose.188  The rationale for this prohibition was to prevent property 
owners from overemphasizing one particular use of the targeted property.189  
                                                 
182 Id.  
183 S. Ry. Co. v. City of Memphis, 148 S.W. 662, 669 (Tenn. 1912).  
184 Layne v. Speight, 529 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Tenn. 1975). 
185 Id. (emphasis added); see also Conness v. Commonwealth, 69 N.E. 341, 341 (Mass. 1904); 
Sacramento S. R.R. Co. v. Heilbron, 104 P. 979, 981 (Cal. 1909). 
186 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-1004 (2007).  
187 Id.  
188 City of Cookeville v. Stites, No. 01-A-01-9505-CV00199, 1995 WL 571851, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Sept. 29, 1995) (citing Davidson County Bd. of Educ. v. First Am. Nat‟l Bank Tr., 301 S.W.2d 905 
(Tenn. 1957)); see also Love v. Smith, 566 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tenn. 1978) (holding that highest and best 
use are one of many factors to consider in assessing fair market value, but it cannot be the sole 
factor); cf. Nashville Hous. Auth. v. Cohen, 541 S.W.2d 947 (Tenn. 1976) (allowing admission of 
evidence as to uses which are currently illegal as long as jury is cautioned to not value the property as 
if rezoning has already occurred but instead as a factor upon the value of the land on the date of 
taking); State ex rel. Comm‟r Dept. of Transp. v. Cox, 840 S.W.2d 357, 363-64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) 
(allowing introduction of evidence as to commercial use even though currently zoned for residential 
use only when commercial use was not found “to be infeasible or remote in likelihood or time”).  
189 Stites, 1995 WL 571851, at *2.  
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However, courts may consider the rental value of the seized property in ascertaining 
its fair market value.190 
 While the courts generally exclude evidence related to a business‟s lost 
profits, this evidence may be admissible if the property owner can establish that the 
targeted property has special value to the owner and there is no other evidence 
evincing a fair market value of the property.191  In Shelby County v. Barden, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
admitting limited evidence of profits and losses.192  The Barden Court stated that even 
though this evidence was not controlling, it could be one of many factors considered 
by the trier of fact to determine the fair market value of the targeted property.193  
Furthermore, the special circumstances exception may allow evidence to be admitted 
related to the value of the targeted property to the property owner.194  When 
examining these special circumstances, the Tennessee Supreme Court has opined 
that:  
If there is a market for the land, the market value is the fact to be 
found.  Only in the special situation where, because of crop failure, 
financial panic, or similar abnormal conditions, there is no market for 
property which in ordinary times has value, is the owner permitted to 
show the value of the property to him.195 
 Courts should consider the impact of pollution and remediation efforts when 
calculating the fair market value of property.196  In State v. Brandon, the Tennessee 
                                                 
190 Union Ry. Co. v. Hunton, 88 S.W. 182, 187 (Tenn. 1905); see also State v. Parkes, 557 S.W.2d 504, 
509 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that “there is no absolute prohibition against admitting evidence of 
rental value, at least where it is presented and interpreted by an expert as a criterion in his assessment 
of the property's fair market value”).  
191 Shelby County v. Barden, 527 S.W.2d 124, 132-33 (Tenn. 1975).  
192 Id. at 133.  
193 Id. (quoting Lebanon & Nashville Tpk. Co. v. Creveling, 17 S.W.2d 22, 26 (Tenn. 1929) (“„[N]et 
income, present or prospective, is not controlling, evidence thereof is altogether competent; the 
weight to be given such evidence as may be adduced being for the jury, in connection with all other 
material evidence.‟”).  
194 State ex rel. Smith v. Livingston Limestone Co., 547 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Tenn. 1977).  
195 Id. at 944 (citing Creveling, 17 S.W.2d 22).  
196 State v. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).  
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Court of Appeals found that contamination directly impacted the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard of the fair market value analysis.197  Therefore, if a trial 
court excluded relevant evidence of contamination and remediation efforts, the 
appealing party would be entitled to a new trial on damages.198  In deciding this issue, 
the Brandon Court approvingly quoted the Florida Supreme Court and asserted that: 
“any factor, including public fear, which impacts . . . the market value of land taken 
for a public purpose may be considered to explain the basis for an expert‟s 
evaluation opinion.  Whether this fear is objectively reasonable is irrelevant to the 
issue of full compensation in an eminent domain proceeding.”199 
 Since courts must consider all legitimate uses for which the property is 
reasonably adaptable,200 courts should also take into account the targeted property‟s 
present zoning201 and imminent rezoning.202  While the traditional standard only 
considers the targeted property‟s fair market value at the time of the taking, this 
current zoning is not dispositive because “zoning changes may be made reflecting 
the changing needs and circumstances of the community.”203  Accordingly, in 
Nashville Housing Authority v. Cohen, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that:  
[I]t is generally recognized that a use which is presently illegal may be 
considered, along with all presently available uses, in determining the 
value of property, if the restrictive law is Malum prohibitum rather 
than Malum in se, and, if there is a reasonable probability that the 
presently illegal use will be made legal in the future.204 
                                                 
197 Id.  
198 Id.  
199 Id. (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So.2d 895, 899 (Fla. 1987)).  
200 Love v. Smith, 566 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tenn. 1978).  
201 State ex rel. Comm‟r of Dept. of Transp. v. Williams, 828 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) 
(citing Shelby County v. Mid-South Title Co., 615 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)).  
202 Nashville Hous. Auth. v. Cohen, 541 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Tenn. 1976). 
203 Williams, 828 S.W.2d at 400.  
204 Cohen, 541 S.W.2d at 950 (citing 4 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, §§ 12.3143(2), 
12.322 (3d ed. 1975)).  
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In Cohen, the housing authority petitioned to seize the respondent‟s property, 
zoned as a single residence parcel, as part of a new housing development in 
Nashville.205  Commercially zoned property surrounded the targeted property and the 
housing authority intended to rezone the targeted property to multi-family 
housing.206  The property owner offered a jury instruction that allowed the jury to 
consider the possible rezoning of the targeted property in its determination of the 
fair market value if the jury found reasonable probability that the rezoning would 
occur.207  However, the trial court rejected this instruction and told the jury that it 
could only consider the value of the property at the time of the taking.208  In 
affirming the court of appeals‟ reversal, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that: 
It is the effect, if any, upon the fair market value on the date of taking 
which makes relevant the evidence of a possible rezoning of the 
property. A prospect of rezoning, no matter how imminent, is 
irrelevant if it has no effect upon such fair market value; and, on the 
other hand, a prospect of rezoning which may appear to be 
somewhat remote should, nevertheless, be considered by the court if 
it affects the fair market value of the property on the date of taking. 
It is this standard of relevance and materiality which the trial judge 
should employ in exercising his discretion to admit or exclude 
evidence offered to show a possible zoning change.209 
Therefore, in Tennessee, the trial court should allow property owners to admit 
evidence of rezoning only to the extent that the evidence impacts the fair market 
value of the targeted property.210 
                                                 
205 Id. at 949. 
206 Id.  
207 Id.  
208 Id. at 950.  
209 Id. at 952 (internal citations omitted). However, the Cohen Court also cautioned that the jury “must 
not evaluate the property as though the possible rezoning were already an accomplished fact, but, that 
in considering value they may take into account the effect, if any, which the possibility of rezoning has 
already had upon the fair market value of the property on the date of taking.” Id.  
210 This same rationale and rule applies equally to deed restrictions.  See State ex rel. Comm‟r of Dept. 
of Transp. v. Williams, 828 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); State ex rel. Comm‟r Dept. of 
Transp. v. Cox, 840 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). 
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2.  Establishing Fair Market Value  
Property owners predominately rely on two forms of evidence to establish a 
fair market value of the targeted property:  comparable sales and opinions as to 
value.  As a preliminary matter, a trial court must decide whether to introduce 
evidence of comparable sales.211  This is a question of law, which the appellate courts 
review for an abuse of discretion.212  A sufficiently comparable sale requires that (1) 
the sale must be voluntary or an arm‟s length transaction213 and (2) the sales are not 
the result of a compromise.214  The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that 
“voluntary” is akin to the “willing buyer/willing seller” standard that guides fair 
market value analysis.215  Thus, the property owner may not introduce evidence of 
sales to the condemning authority,216 sales made under the threat or influence of 
condemnation,217 or sales involving property with unusually stringent restrictions on 
the property‟s use.218 
 If the trial court finds that the sales are at an arm‟s length, then the trial court 
must look to the circumstances of the sales and determine whether the properties are 
similar in nature, location, and time of sale.219  While a general rule does not exist,220 
                                                 
211 Layne v. Speight, 529 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tenn. 1975).  
212 Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Peabody Garage Co., 505 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tenn. 1974). 
213 Id. (quoting State ex rel. State Highway Comm‟n v. Kimmel, 435 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Mo. 1968)). 
214 Coate v. Memphis R.R. Terminal Co., 111 S.W. 923, 924 (Tenn. 1908) (not allowing sales that are 
the result of a compromise); MURPHY, supra note 152, at 17.   
215 Peabody Garage Co., 505 S.W.2d at 722 (quoting Kimmell, 435 S.W.2d at 357).  
216 Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Newton, 484 S.W.2d 896, 897-98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) (“Sales affected 
and influenced by the public project pursuant to which the property to be valued is taken are 
inadmissible to prove the value of the property to be taken.”); Coate, 111 S.W. at 924 (quoting 2 JAMES 
LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 447 (2nd ed. 1900)) (stating that what the 
party condemning the land has paid for other property is incompetent evidence, because “[s]uch sales 
are not a fair criterion of value, for the reason that they are in the nature of a compromise”); see also 
MURPHY, supra note 152, at 17. 
217 See sources cited supra note 216. 
218  MURPHY, supra note 152, at 17-18 (citing Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Ryan, 393 S.W.2d 3 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1964)).  
219 Id. at 18 (citing Ryan, 393 S.W.2d at 11; Lewisburg & N. R.R. Co. v. Hinds, 183 S.W. 985, 997 
(Tenn. 1916); Union Ry. Co. v. Hunton, 88 S.W. 182, 186 (Tenn. 1905)).  
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the trial court should consider the following factors in deciding whether the sales are 
sufficiently comparable:  size of the properties,221 timing of the sales,222 changes in 
conditions of the properties since being sold,223 current zoning,224 imminent 
rezoning,225 location,226 proximity to existing improvements,227 improvements to the 
properties,228 geographic features,229 and all available uses to which the properties are 
adaptable.230  If the trial court determines the sales are sufficiently comparable, the 
jury will decide the weight of these comparable sales in determining the targeted 
property‟s fair market value.231 
 Property owners may also present opinions from lay232 and expert 
witnesses233 to establish fair market value.  Similar to the majority of jurisdictions, in 
                                                                                                                                     
220 Newton, 484 S.W.2d at 897; Maryville Hous. Auth. v. Ramsey, 484 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1972).  
221 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 18 (citing Ryan, 393 S.W.2d at 13). 
222 Id. (citing Ramsey, 484 S.W.2d at 76). 
223 Id. (citing Hinds, 183 S.W. at 996-97). 
224 Id. (citing Shelby County v. Mid-South Title Co., 615 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)). 
225 Id. (citing Mid-South Title Co., 615 S.W.2d at 680). 
226 Id. (citing Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Mid-South Title Co., 443 S.W.2d 492, 499, 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1968)); see also Mid-South Title Co., 615 S.W.2d at 680. 
227 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 18 (citing SACKMAN & ROHAN, 5 NICHOLS‟ THE LAW OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN, § 21.31 (Rev. 3d ed. 1991)).  
228 Id. (citing SACKMAN & ROHAN, supra note 227, at § 21.31). 
229 Id. (citing SACKMAN & ROHAN, supra note 227, at § 21.31). 
230 Id. (citing SACKMAN & ROHAN, supra note 227, at § 21.31). 
231 Id. (citing Shelby County v. Mid-South Title Co., Inc., 615 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)). 
232 Id. (citing State ex rel. Smith v. Livingston Limestone Co., 547 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Tenn. 1977)).  
233 Id. (citing Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Mid-South Title Co., 443 S.W.2d 492, 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1968)); see also Shelby County v. Mid-South Title Co., Inc., 615 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1980); Livingston Limestone Co., 547 S.W.2d at 943.  
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Tennessee, “the owner of real property is held to be qualified, by reason of his 
ownership alone, to give an opinion in evidence of the value of his land.”234  
Likewise, in condemnations involving corporate property owners, the trial court 
must allow the managing officer to present value testimony regarding the 
corporation‟s real property holdings.235  However, the trier of fact should give little 
weight to this evidence when the property owner merely speculates.236  Expert 
witnesses possess different qualifications from the property owners and must base 
their opinions on facts and knowledge of the market.237  The trial court is given 
broad discretion in admitting the expert‟s testimony into evidence,238 and the trier of 
fact is given wide latitude in weighing the credibility of the expert.239  Moreover, the 
expert is not disqualified from offering his opinion if he used “criteria . . . which is 
not altogether standard among appraisers.”240  
Because of the recent changes to the eminent domain laws, experts are 
assured involvement in condemnation actions.  When a condemnor initiates an 
eminent domain proceeding, “it shall deposit the amount determined by the required 
appraisal with the clerk of the court . . . .”241  The required appraisal mandates that the 
appraiser consider the property‟s “highest and best use, its use at the time of the 
taking, and any other uses to which the property is legally adaptable at the time of 
the taking.”242  Such a requirement may be a windfall to appraisers and cause an 
                                                 
234 Livingston Limestone Co., 547 S.W.2d at 943. 
235 Id. 
236 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 18 (citing Airline Constr., Inc. v. Barr, 807 S.W.2d 247, 257 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1990) (stating that “the owner‟s opinion will be given little weight when founded on pure 
speculation” and concluding that “[t]here must be some evidence, apart from mere ownership, that 
this „value‟ is a product of reasoned analysis”)).  
237 Id. (citing Love v. Smith, 566 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tenn. 1978)). 
238 Id. (citing Smith County v. Eatherly, 820 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)); see also State ex 
rel. Comm‟r of Dept. of Transp. v. Veglio, 786 S.W.2d 944, 948 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); State ex rel. 
Moulton v. Blake, 357 S.W.2d 836 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).  
239 Id. (citing State ex rel. Comm‟r Dept. of Transp. v. Brevard, 545 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1976)).  
240 Brevard, 545 S.W.2d at 436.  
241 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-903(a) (2007) (emphasis added).   
242 Id. at § 29-17-1004.  
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increase in litigation surrounding the just compensation issue.  However, the trier of 
fact is not bound by the experts‟ opinions.243 
C.  Incidental Damages and Special Benefits 
The Tennessee Constitution only requires that property owners be 
compensated for the loss of their property, but it does not provide property owners 
with a cause of action for incidental damages.244  However, the General Assembly 
expressly provided that in addition to the fair market value of the targeted property, 
the condemnee is entitled to the “amount of incidental damage done to the residue 
of the owner‟s property, if any, after deducting from the incidental damages to the 
residue the value of all special benefits.”245  Thus, this provision mandates that 
incidental damages are netted against any incidental benefits.  Incidental damages are 
measured by the decline in value resulting from the taking.246  Moreover, the amount 
of incidental damages lies within the province of the jury and will not be disturbed 
on appeal “unless the [award is] shown to be . . . wholly unfair and unreasonable.”247  
The types of compensable incidental damages are a question of law for the trial 
court.248 
Although a jury may award incidental damages to actual condemnees,249 it 
may not award such damages to adjacent property owners.250  Similarly, the property 
owner of condemned property cannot be compensated for the incidental damages 
                                                 
243 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 18 (citing Brevard, 545 S.W.2d at 436). 
244 Lewisburg & N. R.R. Co. v. Hinds, 183 S.W. 985, 989 (Tenn. 1916). 
245 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-910 (2007).  
246 City of Memphis v. Hood, 345 S.W.2d 887, 891 (Tenn. 1961); Shelby County v. Kingsway Greens 
of Am., Inc., 706 S.W.2d 634, 638 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).  
247 Davidson County Bd. of Educ. v. First Am. Nat‟l Bank, 301 S.W.2d 905, 911 (Tenn. 1957).  
248 Metro. Dev. & Hous. Agency v. Trinity Marine Nashville, Inc., 40 S.W.3d 73, 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2000).  
249 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 18 (citing Ledbetter v. Beach, 421 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tenn. 1967); State 
v. Rascoe, 178 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tenn. 1944)).  
250 Id. at 18-19 (citing Ledbetter, 421 S.W.2d at 817; Rascoe, 178 S.W.2d at 395); see also TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 29-17-910 (stating that and “owner” is entitled to damages to the “property or property rights 
taken” and does not provide for compensation to anyone other than the owner).  
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that are not a direct result of the taking.251  Incidental damages that should be taken 
into account include the reasonable expenses of any necessary disassembling, 
loading, transporting to a new location not more than 50 miles from the condemned 
property, and reassembling of personal property at the new location.252  In addition, 
the condemnor should compensate the property owner for any recording fees, 
transfer taxes,253 penalties for early repayment of pre-existing mortgages on the 
condemned property,254 and the pro rata portion of real estate taxes paid that are 
allocable to the earlier of either the date of title vesting in the condemnor or the 
effective date of possession by the condemnor.255  
The eminent domain statutes require that the jury subtract the amount of any 
special benefits that will accrue to the remaining property by the condemnation from 
the incidental damages.256  The jury should generally consider only special benefits 
that have accrued at the time of the taking; however, the court may allow the 
property owner to establish special benefits after the taking to properly account for 
the project‟s impact on the condemned property.257  Furthermore, the General 
Assembly allows property owners whose property has been seized to build or 
improve roads or highways, to continue a damages trial until the condemning entity 
completes the project.258  Examples of special benefits include greater accessibility to 
                                                 
251 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 19 (citing Ledbetter, 421 S.W.2d at 817). 
252 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-114(a)(1) (2007).  
253 Id. at § 29-16-114(d)(1). 
254 Id. at § 29-16-114(d)(2).  
255 Id. at § 29-16-114(d)(3).  
256 Id. at §§ 29-16-114(a)(1);  29-17-910.  
257 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 20 (citing State v. Rascoe, 178 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tenn. 1944)).  
258 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-1001 (2007); MURPHY, supra note 152, at 20.  
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the residue259 and improved parking;260 however, general increases in fair market 
value, which other property owners may enjoy, are not considered.261 
Lastly, the condemnor must pay the property owner interest on any 
judgment awarded.262  The interest rate is “two percentage points (2%) greater than 
the prime loan rate established, as of the date of the taking, by the federal reserve 
system of the United States on any excess of the amount awarded an owner over the 
amount deposited with the clerk.”263 
1.  Leasehold Estates 
 When a condemning authority seizes property that has a lease attached, the 
tenant is entitled to just compensation for the fair market value of the lease.264  The 
rationale is that “[t]he right of which a tenant is deprived and for which he is entitled 
to full compensation is the right to remain in undisturbed possession to the end of 
the term; and the loss resulting from a deprivation of this right is what he is entitled 
to recover.”265  This right to compensation applies to actual takings of the underlying 
property and to impairments to the access of the property.266  Additionally, the 
tenant is entitled to compensation when the condemning authority effectuates a 
partial taking that impairs the fair market value of the total lease.267  The fair market 
                                                 
259 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 20 (citing Newberry v. Hamblen County, 9 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tenn. 
1928)).  
260 Id. at 20 (citing Maryville Hous. Auth. v. Williams, 478 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971)).  
261 Id. at 20 (citing City of Knoxville v. Barton, 159 S.W. 837, 837 (Tenn. 1913)).  
262 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 20.   
263 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-913(a) (2007).  
264 Shelby County v. Barden, 527 S.W.2d 124, 129 (Tenn. 1975); City of Johnson City v. Outdoor 
West, Inc. of Tenn., 947 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Lamar Adver. of Tenn., Inc. v. 
Metro. Dev. & Hous. Auth., 803 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).  
265 City of Nashville v. Mason, 11 Tenn. App. 344, 1930 WL 1650, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 
1930) (citation omitted).  
266 Barden, 527 S.W.2d at 128 (quoting Stokely v. S. Ry. Co., 418 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Tenn. 1967)).  
267 Gallatin Hous. Auth. v. Chambers, 362 S.W.2d 270, 275 (Tenn. 1962).  
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value of the lease is the value of the unexpired lease less any rents owed to the 
landlord.268 
 If the acquired property had improvements, the jury may be called upon to 
decide whether the improvements are permanent and belong to the land owner or 
whether the improvements are temporary and removable and therefore owned by 
the lessee.269  Generally, the lease provisions determine the ownership of 
improvements.270  If the lessee had a right to remove any improvements prior to or 
before the lease expired, the lessee is entitled to just compensation for the 
improvements.271  However, if the removal of the improvements would severely 
damage the value of the property, then the improvements are considered part of the 
property and any compensation would be paid to the property owner.272  The lease 
should expressly state who owns any improvements and the apportionment of any 
just compensation award.  
 A complete taking of the property extinguishes the lease as a matter of law.273  
However, whether a partial taking extinguishes the lease depends on whether the 
parties addressed such a situation in the lease.274  The Restatement (Second) of 
Property provides a default rule that a partial taking terminates the lease if the partial 
taking “significantly interferes with the use contemplated by the parties.”275  If the 
partial taking does not significantly interfere with the use, then there is no taking and 
the lessee is entitled to rent abatement.276  To prevent the default rule from 
                                                 
268 Barden, 527 S.W.2d at 129; Moulton v. George, 348 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tenn. 1961); State ex rel. 
Comm‟r Dept. of Transp. v. Teasley, 913 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting State ex rel. 
Dept. of Transp. v. Gee, 565 S.W.2d 498, 506 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977)). 
269 Barden, 527 S.W.2d at 131; GEORGE A. DEAN & J. KEVIN WALSH, LAND USE PLANNING & 
EMINENT DOMAIN IN TENNESSEE 96 (NAT‟L BUS. INST. 2005). 
270 DEAN & WALSH, supra note 269, at 96. 
271 Id.  
272 Id.  
273 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.:  LANDLORD & TENANT § 8.1(1) (2007).  
274 See id. at § 8.1(2). 
275 Id. at § 8.1(2)(a)  
276 Id. at § 8.1(2)(b).  
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controlling the situation, the parties should include language in the lease that 
specifically addresses partial takings and inverse condemnation proceedings.   
2.  Relocation Assistance Acts 
 Condemnees may also face moving expenses.  The federal government 
enacted the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policy Act 
of 1970 (“URA”)277 to provide “fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced as a 
direct result of programs or projects undertaken by a [f]ederal agency or with 
[f]ederal financial assistance.”278  Congress sought to minimize the impact of 
displacement and ensure that such persons did not suffer “disproportionate injuries” 
caused by a project that was designed to benefit the public at large.279  Similarly, 
Tennessee‟s General Assembly enacted the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 
1972 (“URAA”)280 to effectuate the same protections and public policies as the 
federal government.281  The provisions of both acts are mandatory and apply to any 
condemning authority using either federal or state funds.282  This section focuses on 
Tennessee‟s URAA and its procedures.283 
 The URAA contains a definition section284 along with provisions for assisting 
displaced persons with finding and financing replacement homes and business 
                                                 
277 Federal Uniform Relocation Assistance & Real Property Acquisition Policy Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4601-4655 (2007).  
278 Id. at § 4621(b) (stating the public policy of the URA).   
279 42 U.S.C. § 4621(b) (“The primary purpose of this subchapter is to ensure that such persons shall 
not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs and projects designed for the benefit of 
the public as a whole and to minimize the hardship of displacement on such persons.”).  
280 Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1972, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-101 to -119 (2007).  
281 Id. at § 13-11-102 (defining the purpose of the URAA and tracking the language of the federal 
counterpart).  
282 See 42 U.S.C. § 4621(b); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-102. 
283 For a thorough discussion of the federal URA see U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE 
OF CMTY. PLANNING & DEV., When a Public Agency Acquires Your Property, Mar. 2005, 
http://www.hud.gov/utilities/intercept.cfm?/offices/cpd/library/relocation/publications/1041.pdf; 
see also MURPHY, supra note 152, at 31.  
284 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-103. 
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locations.285  In addition, the URAA requires the public body to provide advisory 
services to assist displaced persons with locating suitable replacement property, 
planning for the move, and supplying information about other available federal and 
state assistance programs.286  A “displaced person” is generally defined to include any 
person who loses his or her property to a state agency or local public body for the 
development of a public project and includes both residential and commercial 
property owners.287  However, a “displaced person” does not include unlawful 
occupants288 or any person “who occupies such property on a rental basis for a short 
term or a period subject to termination when the property is needed for the program 
or project.”289  A displaced person who qualifies as a residential displacee is entitled 
to payments for relocation and moving expenses290 and may also be entitled to 
additional costs for replacement property.291 
The residential displacee may elect to receive either actual moving expenses 
or a payment based upon a schedule determined by the governor‟s designee.292  If the 
residential displacee elects to receive actual moving expenses, those expenses must 
be reasonable and evidenced by paid receipts.293  Moreover, the residential displacee 
may request that any commercial movers bill the State directly.294  The residential 
                                                 
285 Id. at § 13-11-105.   
286 Id. at § 13-11-108.  
287 Id. at § 13-11-103(3)(A); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.03(8)(a) (2007) (defining “displaced 
persons” for the Tennessee Department of Transportation). 
288 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-103(3)(B)(i); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.03(8)(b)(8). 
289 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-103(3)(B)(ii); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.03(8)(b)(4).  
290 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-105.  
291 Id. at § 13-11-106; TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(3)(a).  
292 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-105(a)-(b).  For a general discussion of Tennessee‟s relocation 
guidelines for displaced persons see Tenn. Dept. of Transp., Right of Way Div., Information on 
Relocation Assistance Program, 
http://www.tdot.state.tn.us/Chief_Engineer/assistant_engineer_design/row/relocation.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2007).  
293 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-105(a), -113(2); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.09(2), -.10(1).  
294 TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.10(2). 
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displacee may seek reimbursement for the following reasonable expenses:  moving 
expenses within a 50-mile radius of acquired property;295 transportation costs to the 
new location, limited to either a standard mileage rate determined by the State or 
reasonable and actual fees incurred if a commercial mover is employed;296 if 
approved in advance and upon a showing of need, actual meals and lodging 
expenses;297 “packing, crating, unpacking, and uncrating of personal property”;298 
disconnecting, disassembling, removing, reassembling appliances and other personal 
property;299 “the cost of insurance for the replacement value of personal property 
moved or stored in connection with the replacement”;300 “the reasonable 
replacement value of property lost, stolen, or damaged” during the move that was 
not caused by the residential displacee or otherwise covered by insurance;301 and 
storage costs for up to 12-months with prior approval.302 
If the residential displacee does not wish to keep track of the actual expenses, 
he may elect to receive a fixed expense and dislocation allowance.303  This payment is 
determined according to a schedule provided by the Federal Highway 
Administration.304  For example, according to the schedule, a Tennessee residential 
displacee with a furnished eight-room dwelling would be entitled to approximately 
$1,900.305  Generally, if the residential displacee elects this option, the State will not 
                                                 
295 Id. at 1680-6-2-.10(1)(a).  
296 Id. at 1680-6-2-.10(1)(a)(1).  
297 Id. at 1680-6-2-.10(1)(a)(3).  
298 Id. at 1680-6-2-.10(1)(b).  
299 Id. at 1680-6-2-.10(1)(c).  
300 Id. at 1680-6-2-.10(1)(e).  
301 Id.  
302 Id. at 1680-6-2-.10(1)(d).  
303 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-105(b) (2007); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.10(3)(a). 
304 TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.10(3)(b); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-105(b) (stating 
that the schedule “established by the governor or the governor‟s designee”); U.S. Dept. of Transp., 
Fed. Highway Admin., Fixed Residential Moving Cost Schedule, (June 15, 2005), 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/realestate/fixsch96.htm. 
305 U.S. Dept. of Transp., Fed. Highway Admin., supra note 304. 
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pay additional claims for moving expenses.306  As such, if the residential displacee 
anticipates unusual moving expenses, a fixed allowance may not be the most 
beneficial option for him.  
In addition to receiving moving expenses, the residential displacee may be 
eligible for replacement housing payments.307  These payments come in three basic 
forms:  purchase supplement, rental supplement, and down payment supplement.308  
The eligibility for these payments depends on whether the residential displacee is an 
owner or tenant as well as the length of occupancy in the acquired property.309  There 
are two occupancy time period classifications that determine the type of payment 
available:  180-day owner and 90-day owner/tenant.310  A 180-day owner is one who 
occupied the property for more than 180 days.311  A 90-day owner/tenant is either an 
owner or a tenant who occupied the property between 90 and 179 days.312  Under the 
URAA, a 180-day owner may be eligible for a purchase supplement not to exceed 
$22,500313 or a rental supplement not to exceed $5,250.314  On the other hand, a 90-
day owner/tenant may be eligible for a rental supplement not to exceed $5,250.315  
                                                 
306 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-105(b) (stating that the expense and dislocation allowance is “in lieu 
of” the actual reasonable expenses incurred); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.10(3)(a) (stating that 
the expense and dislocation allowance is “an alternative to payment for actual moving and related 
expenses”). 
307 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-106, -107; TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)-(2). 
308 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-106, -107; TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(b), -.13(2)(b)-(c). 
309 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-106, -107; TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13. 
310 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-106(a), -107(a); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(a), -
.13(2)(a). 
311 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-106(a); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(a)(1). 
312 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-107(a)(1); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(2)(a)(1), 
313 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-106(a); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(b).  
314 TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(f).  
315 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-107(a)(2); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(2)(a)-(b). 
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The purchase supplement for a 180-day owner has three components:  price 
differential,316 increased interest costs,317 and incidental expenses.318  The price 
differential is the amount that a replacement dwelling exceeds the acquisition price of 
the acquired dwelling.319  Additional interest costs may be reimbursed if the interest 
rate on a new mortgage is higher than the interest rate on a mortgage on the 
residential displacee‟s current dwelling.320  Incidental expenses associated with the 
purchase of the new home, such as recording fees, title searches, and other closing 
costs are also reimbursable by the State.321  However, the total of these three 
amounts cannot exceed $22,500.322 
In addition to the purchase supplement, the State offers 180-day owners and 
90-day owner/tenants a rental supplement that allows residential displacees to rent a 
comparable replacement dwelling for up to 42 months.323  The State will calculate the 
amount of the rental supplement based on the difference between the rent currently 
paid by the residential displacee and the rent for a comparable property, but this 
amount cannot exceed $5,250.324  The displacing agency may disburse the rental 
supplement in a lump sum payment or through installments.325  A 180-day residential 
                                                 
316 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-106(a)(1); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(c).  
317 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-106(a)(2); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(d).  
318 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-106(a)(3); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(e).  
319 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-106(a)(1); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(b)(1). For 
example:  a 180-day owner occupant would receive $5,000 in price differential payment if the value of 
the current home is $10,000 and the State finds a comparable home for $15,000.  
320 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-106(a)(2); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(d)(1).  
321 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-106(a)(3); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(e).  
322 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-106(a); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(b).  
323 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-107(a)(2); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(f), -.13(b)(1).  
324 TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(f), -.13(2)(b)(1).  For example:  If the current rent for a 
residential displacee is $150 per month and the State finds a comparable property for $200 per month 
the maximum rental supplement would be $2,100 ($200 replacement rent - $150 current rent x 42 
months = $2,100).  
325 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-107(a)(2); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(2)(b)(3).  
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displacee may elect to forgo his entitlement to a purchase supplement and receive 
the rental supplement instead.326   
The final category of supplements reflects the long-standing public policy of 
encouraging home ownership by making 90-day owner/tenants eligible to receive a 
down payment supplement in lieu of the rental supplement.327  The down payment 
supplement cannot exceed $5,250 and is limited to the combined costs of the down 
payment and any reasonable incidental expenses incurred in the purchase of a 
replacement dwelling.328  Similarly to the purchase supplement, the incidental 
expenses associated with the down payment supplement include title searches, 
recording fees, transfer taxes, etc.329  
When calculating the costs of comparable replacement dwellings for the 
residential displacee, the State must consider the asking price of at least three 
comparable dwellings, if available.330  The comparison dwellings should be those 
“most nearly representative of, and equal to or better than, the displacement 
dwelling.”331  The State may adjust the cost estimate based on local market data.332  
Before entering into a sales contract or a rental agreement, the State must 
inspect the replacement dwelling to ensure that it is a “decent, safe, and sanitary 
dwelling.”333  The 180-day owner-occupant who is displaced must purchase a 
replacement dwelling within one year from the later of:  (1) the date the residential 
displacee received the final payment for the acquired dwelling or, in the case of an 
                                                 
326 TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(f).  
327 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-107(b); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(2)(c).  A 180-day owner 
who is eligible to receive a replacement housing payment is not eligible for the down payment 
supplement.  TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(2)(c)(1). 
328 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-107(b); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(2)(c)(2)-(3).  
329 TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(1)(e), -.13(2)(c)(3).  
330 TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.13(3)(a)(1).  
331 Id.  
332 Id. (“An adjustment shall be made to the asking price of any dwelling to the extent justified by local 
market data.  An obviously overpriced dwelling may be ignored.”). 
333 Id. at 1680-6-2-.13(3)(b); see also id. at 1680-6-2-.03(6) (defining “decent, safe, and sanitary 
dwelling”).  
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eminent domain action, the date the requisite deposit was made to the court334 or (2) 
the date the State makes a comparable replacement dwelling available pursuant to the 
URAA prior to displacement.335  A residential displacee satisfies the one year 
requirement if he purchases either a “decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling”336 or, with 
some limitations, does any of the following:  purchases and renovates a substandard 
housing;337 relocates the dwelling to a new location;338 builds a “decent, safe, and 
sanitary dwelling” on land owned or purchased by the displacee;339 contracts for the 
purchase or construction with a builder;340 or occupies a previously owned 
dwelling.341  A 90-day occupant must rent or purchase and occupy “a decent, safe, 
and sanitary replacement dwelling” within one year.342  If the 90-day occupant is a 
tenant, the one year begins on the date the person moves from the displaced 
property.343  If the 90-day occupant is an owner-occupant, the one year begins on the 
later of (1) the date the residential displacee received the final payment for the 
acquired dwelling or, in the case of an eminent domain action, the date the requisite 
deposit was made to the court, or (2) the date the person moves from the displaced 
property.344 
Aside from the financial assistance, the URAA requires the State to provide 
Relocation Advisory Services to explain the relocation process, assist with planning, 
and make replacement dwellings available.345  A relocation agent will interview each 
                                                 
334 Id. at 1680-6-2-.13(1)(a)(2)(i). 
335 Id. at 1680-6-2-.07(5), -.13(1)(a)(2)(ii).  
336 Id. at 1680-6-2-.13(3)(e)(1).  
337 Id. at 1680-6-2-.13(3)(e)(2).  
338 Id. at 1680-6-2-.13(3)(e)(3).  
339 Id. at 1680-6-2-.13(3)(e)(4).  
340 Id. at 1680-6-2-.13(3)(e)(4)(5). 
341 Id. at 1680-6-2-.13(3)(e)(6).  
342 Id. at 1680-6-2-.13(2)(a)(2). 
343 Id. at 1680-6-2-.13(2)(a)(2)(i). 
344 Id. at 1680-6-2-.13(2)(a)(2)(ii). 
345 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-108(c); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.07(4).  
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residential displacee and strive to minimize the impact of the relocation.346  
Furthermore, the relocation agent must assure the residential displacee that he 
cannot be forced to relocate without a minimum of 90 days notice347 and the State 
provides at least one comparable property.348   
In addition to assisting residential displacees, the URAA requires the State to 
assist business owners and farmers when their property is acquired for a public 
project.349  The commercial displacee regulations generally mirror those for 
residential displacees.350  Commercial displacees may be reimbursed for actual and 
reasonable moving expenses performed either by themselves or by commercial 
movers.351  Moreover, commercial displacees may receive a reestablishment payment, 
not to exceed $10,000, for actual and reasonable expenses incurred in relocating and 
reestablishing small businesses, farms, or non-profit organizations at a new 
location.352  Commercial displacees may elect to receive a fixed payment, not less 
than $1,000 or greater than $20,000, in lieu of actual moving and reestablishment 
expenses.353  To be eligible for the fixed payment, the State must determine whether 
the commercial displacee must be moved as a result of the displacement and does so 
vacate or move;354 cannot be relocated without a substantial loss of existing 
business;355 is not part of an enterprise with more than three other establishments 
under the same ownership and engaged in the same or similar activity and not being 
acquired;356 the business is not being operated for the sole purpose of renting the 
                                                 
346 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-108(c)(1)-(2); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.07(4)(a).  
347 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-108(c)(3); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.06(1)(c).  
348 TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.06(1)(c), -.07(4)(b), -.07(5)(a).  
349 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-103(A)(ii); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.07(4)(d). 
350 See generally TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.11. 
351 Id. at 1680-6-2-.11(1)-(2).  
352 Id. at 1680-6-2-.11(4)(a).  
353 Id. at 1680-6-2-.11(5)(a)(2).  
354 Id. at 1680-6-2-.11(50(a)(1)(i).  
355 Id. at 1680-6-2-.11(5)(a)(1)(ii).  
356 Id. at 1680-6-2-.11(5)(a)(1)(iii).  
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property to others;357 and that “[t]he business contributed materially to the income of 
the displaced person during the two taxable years prior to displacement.”358  The 
fixed payment is determined by the State based upon the average annual net earnings 
of the business during the two prior tax years.359  
Both residential and commercial displacees who are unsatisfied with either 
the determination of eligibility or the amount of relocation benefits may appeal the 
decision within the agency.360  The displacee should notify his relocation agent in 
writing of his intent to appeal.361  The displacee has 60 days after receiving written 
notice of the displacing agency action to file an appeal unless the agency has 
expressly extended the time for appeal.362  During the appeal, the displacee may 
present evidence and be represented by counsel.363  The agency must render a 
decision within 30 days, and this decision is not subject to judicial review, except as 
the law may provide under common law writs of certiorari.364 
3.  Professional Responsibility 
 According to the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer assumes 
many roles when representing clients.365  By representing condemnors or property 
owners, an eminent domain practitioner may be called upon to serve as an advisor, 
advocate, negotiator, intermediary, and evaluator.366  When representing condemning 
                                                 
357 Id. at 1680-6-2-.11(5)(a)(1)(iv)-(v). 
358 Id. at 1680-6-2-.11(5)(a)(1)(vi).  
359 Id. at 1680-6-2-.11(5)(e)(1).  For example:  if a business reported a net earnings of $8,000 in 2005 
and $10,000 in 2006, the commercial displacee would be entitled to a fixed payment of $9,000.  
360 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-11-113(3) (2007); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.16(1).  
361 TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-6-2-.16(2)(a). 
362 Id. at 1680-6-2-.16(2)(b).  
363 Id. at 1680-6-2-.16(5).  
364 Id. at 1680-6-2-.16(6)-(7).  
365 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8, RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. pmbl. ¶ 3 (2007). 
366 Id.  
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authorities, lawyers must decide whether the government has met all the statutory 
and regulatory requirements, give advice about which legal avenue is most 
advantageous to effectuate the taking, negotiate with property owners, and, if 
necessary, advocate as to why the taking is necessary.  Similarly, lawyers who 
represent property owners must ensure that the government pays just compensation 
to the property owners and does not overstep its statutory authority.  Therefore, 
each of these roles raises many ethical considerations for eminent domain 
practitioners.  
 An attorney who represents a property owner in an eminent domain action 
will most likely begin his representation by negotiating with the condemning 
authority.  As such, the attorney should disclose to the administrative agency that he 
is serving in a representative capacity for the property owner.367  Furthermore, when 
negotiating with the condemning authority, the attorney has the responsibility to 
“not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law . . . .”368  Interestingly, 
the comments to Rule 4.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct make it clear that 
when an attorney makes statements about the value of the targeted property during 
negotiations, those statements are not material statements of fact.369 
 If there are several interested owners, such as partners, tenants, landlords, 
and mortgagees, an attorney may represent multiple parties in the condemnation.  
Although the conflict of interest rules generally prohibit one lawyer from 
representing multiple parties whose interests may be adverse to one another,370 Rule 
1.7(a) provides an exception.  A lawyer may represent multiple parties if “(1) the 
lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the 
relationship with the other client; and (2) each client consents in writing after 
consultation.”371  As a practical matter, it may be problematic for one lawyer to 
represent a landlord and the landlord‟s tenants because the eminent domain award 
will be apportioned among the parties.  If the joint representation fails, then the 
lawyer generally will have to withdraw from the transactions altogether.372 
                                                 
367 Id. at R. 3.9. 
368 Id. at R. 4.1(a).  
369 Id. at R. 4.1 cmt. 2.  
370 Id. at R. 1.7(a). 
371 Id. at R. 1.7(a).  
372 Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 20.  
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 Eminent domain actions are often an expensive “battle of the experts,” and 
clients may call upon their lawyers to advance the costs of these experts as part of 
the employment agreement.  The general rule espoused by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct prohibits lawyers from providing financial assistance to a client in 
anticipation of litigation.373  However, a lawyer may advance litigation expenses, “the 
repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.”374  This 
exception allows greater access to the justice system and ensures that property 
owner‟s rights are protected.  Although each of these are important considerations, 
this section only touches the tip of the iceberg concerning ethical considerations that 
lawyers should consider in representing either condemning authorities or property 
owners.  
IV.  Representing Clients in Eminent Domain Proceedings 
 Two chapters within Title 29 of the Tennessee Code Annotated primarily 
govern the procedures for bringing and defending eminent domain actions in 
Tennessee.  First, chapter 16 details the procedures for filing the petition, the 
procedures for providing notice to affected parties to be named as defendants, what 
constitutes damages, how to select the jury of view, and how to appeal either the use 
of eminent domain or the damages assessed.375  Second, chapter 17 relates to 
eminent domain by public agencies and addresses the more policy-oriented issues, 
such as expressing the legislative intent, defining “public use,” and delegating the 
power of eminent domain to various public agencies.376  These two chapters work in 
tandem to guide public agencies and practitioners through the condemnation process 
and should be strictly followed and narrowly construed to effectuate the General 
Assembly‟s desired results. 
A.  Necessity 
Before a condemnor can file an eminent domain petition to seize private 
property, certain steps should be followed to avoid challenges and possible reversals 
by the appellate courts.  After a condemnor has selected which parcel or interest of 
property it wishes to seize, it should investigate whether this particular parcel or 
                                                 
373 Id. at R. 1.8(e). 
374 Id. at R. 1.8(e)(1).  
375 See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-16-101 to -127 (2007). 
376 See id. at §§ 29-17-101 to -1004 (2007).  
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interest is necessary to achieve its goal.377  The Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled 
that absent a showing of “fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious action” by the 
condemnor, a condemnor‟s determination of necessity is conclusive upon the 
courts.378  Arbitrary and capricious actions are “willful and unreasonable action[s] 
without consideration or in disregard of facts or without determining principle.”379  
Conversely, actions are not arbitrary and capricious when “exercised honestly and 
upon due consideration, where there is room for two opinions, however much it 
may be believed that an erroneous conclusion was reached.”380  The courts have 
consistently noted that, “[s]electing the property to be taken, as contradistinguished 
from similar property in the same locality, determining its suitableness for the use to 
which it is proposed to put it, as well as deciding the quantity required, are all 
political questions, which inhere in and constitute the chief value of the power to 
take.”381  Therefore, private property owners cannot ask a court to supplant its own 
opinion regarding the necessity of the project for that of the condemning 
authority.382  
B.   Authority 
Next, the condemnor must establish that it has the authority to seize the 
private property.383  The General Assembly has empowered a number of public and 
private agencies with the power of eminent domain.384  Pursuant to this power, the 
                                                 
377 City of Knoxville v. Heth, 210 S.W.2d 326, 331 (Tenn. 1948); MURPHY, supra note 152, at 12 
(stating that the private property must be “necessary for the accomplishment of the public use”). 
378 Heth, 210 S.W.2d at 331; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 14. 
379 Metro. Gov‟t of Nashville & Davidson County v. Denson, No. 01-A-01-9005CV00174, 1990 WL 
154646, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 1990) (quoting BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (5th ed.)); accord 
Wagoner v. City of Arlington, 345 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tex. App. 1961).  
380 Denson, 1990 WL 154646, at *6 (quoting In re Persons Employed at St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber 
Co., 110 P.2d 877, 883 (Wash. 1941)).  
381 S. Ry. Co. v. City of Memphis, 148 S.W. 662, 665 (Tenn. 1912); accord Heth, 210 S.W.2d at 331 
(quoting S. Ry. Co., 148 S.W.2d at 665); First Util. Dist. of Knox County v. Jarnigan-Bodden, 40 
S.W.3d 60, 64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting S. Ry. Co., 148 S.W.2d at 665); City of Maryville v. 
Edmondson, 931 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting S. Ry. Co., 148 S.W.2d at 665).  
382 Justus v. McMahan, 226 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tenn. 1949).  
383 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 12. 
384 Id. at 1-2. 
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condemnor authorizes the condemnation by enacting either an ordinance or a 
resolution.385  However, if the enabling statute requires the condemnor to enact an 
ordinance, then a resolution is insufficient.386  The resolution or ordinance should 
recite the nature of the project, that the property is being condemned for the public‟s 
use and interest, that the identified parcel or property interest is necessary to 
accomplish the public use, and specifically authorize the institution of condemnation 
proceedings.387  After the condemnor‟s legislative body has passed the resolution or 
ordinance, counsel should attach a copy of the resolution or ordinance to the 
petition or incorporate it by reference.388 
C.  Notice 
Once the legislative body has addressed the public policy of the 
condemnation, the condemnor may proceed with the actual taking of the parcel or 
interest.  However, unlike most civil proceedings which begin with a traditional 
summons, eminent domain actions are initiated by serving notice of the filing on the 
defendants.389  At least five days before the petition is presented to the court, the 
condemnor must provide a copy of the petition to owners of the land or interest.390  
The notice should advise the owner of the proceedings and the date the petition will 
be filed.391  If the owner is not a resident of the county in which the property is 
located, the condemnor should give notice to the owner‟s agent.392  If the owner is a 
                                                 
385 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 12 (citing Hawkins County v. Mallory, No. C.A. #91, 1985 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 2621, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 1985)).  
386 Id. (citing City of Johnson City v. Campbell, No. E2000-01345-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 112311, at 
*6, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001) (noting that “[a] resolution is a mere expression of the opinion of 
the mind of the City Council concerning some matter of administration coming within its official 
cognizance”; whereas, “[o]rdinances are rules or regulations adopted by municipal corporations in 
pursuance of powers granted by the law of the land”) (internal citations omitted)). 
387 Id. (citing Will A. Wilkerson, The Institution and Prosecution of Condemnation Proceedings, 26 TENN. L. 
REV. 325, 325-26 (1959).  
388 Id.  
389 Johnson v. Roane County, 370 S.W.2d 496, 498-99 (Tenn. 1963); Wilkerson, supra note 387, at 326. 
390 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-105(a) (2007).  
391 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 6 (citing GRIFFIN & STOKES, EMINENT DOMAIN IN TENNESSEE 23 
(rev. ed. Jul. 1979)). 
392 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-105(a).  
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non-resident of Tennessee or is unknown, the condemnor may provide notice 
through publication in a manner similar to chancery cases.393  However, if the name 
or address of a non-resident owner is known or readily ascertainable, the Due 
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment requires that the condemnor provide more 
than notice by publication.394  
While Tennessee statutes are silent as to the exact manner of service, Rule 71 
of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure states that the Rules of Civil Procedure 
should be followed to the extent they are consistent with the eminent domain 
statutes.395  Thus, the condemnor may provide service in any manner consistent with 
Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.396  Similarly, the owner should 
return notice of service consistent with Rule 4.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 
Procedure.397  
D.  Petition 
When providing notice, the condemnor must include a copy of the eminent 
domain petition.398  The condemnor must file the petition in the circuit court of the 
county in which the land is located.399  The petition must state the following four 
elements:  (1) the precise parcel or interest of the property wanted by the 
condemnor;400 (2) either the name of the owner or that the owner is unknown;401 (3) 
the reasons the parcel or interest is wanted;402 and (4) request that the parcel or 
                                                 
393 Id. at § 29-16-105(b); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 21-1-204 (providing for service by publication 
for cases in chancery).  
394 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 6 (citing Baggett v. Baggett, 541 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tenn. 1976)).  
395 TENN. R. CIV. P. 71(2007); MURPHY, supra note 152, at 6.  
396 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 6. 
397 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 6; see also TENN. R. CIV. P. 4.03.  
398 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-105(a) (2007). 
399 Id. at § 29-16-104; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 5.  
400 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-104(1).  
401 Id. at § 29-16-104(2).  
402 Id. at § 29-16-104(3).  
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interest be decreed to the condemnor and “set apart by metes and bounds, or other 
proper mode.”403  The petition should name “all parties having any interest in any 
way in such land or rights.”404  If the condemnor omits an owner from the petition, 
then the proceeding shall not cover or affect his interest.405  
E.  Jury of View 
After the condemnor has provided the requisite notice, it should move the 
court to issue a writ of inquiry of damages to the sheriff commanding him to 
summon a jury of view.406  The jury will ascertain the amount the owner is entitled to 
receive.407  At this stage in the litigation process, the owner may challenge the 
proposed taking.408  The owner may do so by attacking the alleged public use, the 
enabling statute, or the necessity of the taking.409  These issues involve questions of 
law that the court must determine before the case proceeds to the jury of view for a 
determination of damages.410  If the owner fails to show sufficient cause to prevent 
the taking, the court must issue the writ.411  After notice of service to the sheriff, the 
parties may agree or the condemnor may apply for the writ to be issued by the clerk 
of the court.412  This efficiency measure at the threshold stage moves the proceedings 
                                                 
403 Id. at § 29-16-104(4).  
404 Id. at § 29-16-106.  
405 Id.  Furthermore, unborn remaindermen are bound by the proceedings if all living persons in 
interest are parties. Id.  
406 The jury of view is compensated according to the population of the county. TENN. CODE ANN. § 
29-16-125. Additionally, a person cannot be compelled to serve on a jury of view more than once 
every two years. Id. at § 29-16-125(c).  
407 Id. at § 29-16-107(a). 
408 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-107(a); MURPHY, supra note 152, at 6 (citing Wilkerson, supra note 387, 
at 327). 
409 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 7. 
410 Id. 
411 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-107(a); MURPHY, supra note 152, at 7.  
412 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-107(b).  
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along without court intervention.  However, the owner may object and bring the 
motion to issue the writ of inquiry before the court.413  
After the writ is issued, the case proceeds to the selection of a jury of view.414  
The jury of view consists of five members of the general public who have no interest 
in the targeted property and possess the same qualifications as other civil litigation 
jurors.415  The parties may agree on a different number of jurors and may also 
challenge the jurors for cause through peremptorily challenges.416  The jurors may be 
nominated by the court, selected by the parties, or summoned by the sheriff for 
service.417  Unless the court decides otherwise, the sheriff must provide the 
prospective jurors with at least three days notice of the time and place of the 
hearing.418 
Once the court empanels the jury, members are sworn to act fairly and 
impartially, to describe the targeted property by metes and bounds, and to investigate 
and determine the amount of damages owed to the property owner.419  During the 
investigation, the jury may visit the targeted property and hear testimony–but not 
argument from counsel–about the property.420  After viewing the targeted property 
and hearing the testimony, the jury will decide what portion of the land is needed to 
meet the public use and determine the amount of damages owed to the property 
owner.421 
After reaching its decision about the amount of property to transfer to the 
condemnor and the amount of compensation owed to the property owner, the jury 
                                                 
413 Id.  
414 Id. at § 29-16-107; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 7. 
415 TENN. CODE ANN. §§  29-16-108, -109; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 7.  
416 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-108; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 7.  
417 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-109.  
418 Id. at § 29-16-111; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 7.  
419 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-112; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 7.  
420 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-113; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 7.  
421 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-113; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 7.  
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must reduce its finding to a writing signed by a majority of the jurors.422  The jurors 
deliver the report to the sheriff who then delivers it to the court.423  Either party may 
object to the report, and, upon a showing of good cause, the court may set aside the 
report and order a new writ of inquiry.424  However, if neither party objects, the court 
will confirm the report and transfer the ownership rights to the condemnor once the 
condemnor either pays the property owner or deposits the funds with the clerk of 
the court.425 
F.  Appeal 
If a party objects to the jury‟s report, the party may appeal and “have a trial 
anew before a jury in the usual way.”426  The parties must appeal within 45 days from 
the court‟s order confirming the jury of view‟s report.427  If the property owner does 
not challenge the right to condemn and limits his appeal to damages, “the property 
owner [is] entitled to open and close the argument before the court and jury.”428  The 
property owner‟s appeal does not suspend the condemnor‟s operations on the newly 
acquired property.429  However, to continue operations during the challenge, the 
condemnor must provide a bond for double the amount of the jury‟s award payable 
to the property owners and approved by the clerk.430  Additionally, the condemnor 
must agree “to abide by and perform the final judgment in the premises.”431  If the 
trial jury‟s verdict affirms the jury of view‟s findings or is more unfavorable to the 
                                                 
422TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-115; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 7.  
423 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-115; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 7.  
424 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-117; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 8. 
425 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-116; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 7-8. 
426 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-118(a).  The appealing party must also give security for the costs of the 
trial.  Id.  
427 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-118(c); MURPHY, supra note 152, at 8.  
428 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-118(b).  However, the statute is silent as to whether the condemnor 
may make opening or closing statements to the trier of fact.   
429 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-120; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 8.  
430 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-120; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 8.  
431 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-120; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 8.  
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appellant than the original award, the costs of the appeal will be taxed to the 
appellant; “otherwise the court may award costs as in chancery cases.”432 
 Finally, Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure allows the 
condemnor to take a voluntary nonsuit in the condemnation proceeding.433  
However, once the court has confirmed the jury of view‟s report, the condemnor 
cannot voluntarily nonsuit an eminent domain petition.434 
G.  Tactics and Strategies 
 In all eminent domain actions, the condemning authority must provide 
notice of the proposed taking.435  As a result, the condemning authorities will 
generally attempt to save litigation expenses and prevent delays by negotiating with 
the property owner before initiating any condemnation proceedings.  If the 
condemning authority makes an offer to buy the property, owner‟s counsel should 
carefully review the offer and ensure that his client‟s rights are protected.  This 
includes verifying that the offer accurately describes by metes and bounds the 
property being acquired.  Furthermore, the attorney will want to ascertain whether 
the offer encompasses all of the elements of just compensation, incidental awards, 
and assistance under the URAA.  The attorney may protect these rights by 
coordinating an independent appraisal of the targeted property or reviewing the 
government‟s appraisal with the property owner to guarantee that he understands 
which rights are being relinquished as part of the settlement.  
                                                 
432 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-16-119; MURPHY, supra note 152, at 8.  
433 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 8 (citing Anderson v. Smith, 521 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tenn. 1975)).  The 
Anderson Court reasoned that case law and Rule 41.01 provide:  
that the condemnor has the right to take a nonsuit at any time prior to the case 
being submitted to the trier of fact for decision, unless the condemnor has taken 
possession of the property under court order issued under circumstances leaving 
nothing to be decided by the court except the compensation to be paid the owner 
for the land taken.  
Anderson, 521 S.W.2d at 791. 
434 See sources cited supra note 433.   
435 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-16-105(a), 29-17-903(c); MURPHY, supra note 152, at 10. 
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 In the event of a partial taking, the offer should carefully delineate the 
property rights the condemning authority is acquiring and the rights remaining with 
the property owners.  Early attention to detail will assist in limiting the scope of the 
taking and protecting the property owner if the condemning authority‟s plan changes 
and it attempts to take more rights than originally purchased.  If a governing body 
must approve the acceptance of the offer, the property owner should insist on a time 
limit to add finality and predictability to the process.  Moreover, the property owner 
should insist that any sales contract must specifically state that the sale occurred 
under the threat of condemnation for tax purposes.  Taxpayers may defer the 
recognition of capital gains from the sale of property if it was an involuntary 
conversion and the just compensation award was used to purchase replacement 
housing.436  Additionally, the property owner may be able to take advantage of other 
capital gains deferrals under the “like kind exchange” rules found in section 1031 of 
the Internal Revenue Code.437 
 The property owner may challenge either the condemning authority‟s right to 
take the property or the amount of the just compensation offer in court.438  The 
government‟s eminent domain powers are very broad, and courts have traditionally 
allowed great deference to the government in condemnation actions; therefore, the 
majority of property owner challenges have concentrated on the amount of just 
compensation owed.  In a challenge to the amount of just compensation, the 
proceedings are likely to become a battle of the experts with value being the most 
important and most highly contested aspect.439  Generally, the most vital expert is the 
property appraiser.440  Consequently, the appraiser should be highly qualified and 
have experience not only in real estate appraisals, but also in appraising the particular 
type of property being seized and making evaluations in the geographic area.441   The 
                                                 
436 See generally I.R.C. § 1033 (2007) (providing the rules applicable to involuntary conversions); see also 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP‟T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL‟N 544: SALES & OTHER 
DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS 5-10 (2006), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p544.pdf (discussing tax 
consequences of involuntary sales). 
437 See generally I.R.C. § 1031 (providing the rules applicable to like kind exchanges); see also INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 436, at 5-10 (discussing tax consequences of involuntary sales). 
438 MURPHY, supra note 152, at 12.   
439 JAMES C. COPE & JAMES L. MURPHY, III, GETTING SUCCESSFUL RESULTS IN TENNESSEE 
EMINENT DOMAIN ACTIONS 39 (Nat‟l Bus. Inst. 2003).  
440 Id. at 40. 
441 Id. 
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appraiser must be either designated as a Member of the Appraisal Institute or 
licensed by the State.442  
Furthermore, the property owner may need to hire other experts, such as 
architects, planners, economists, geologists, biologists, and engineers, to establish a 
fair market value of the targeted property.443  Although the complexity of the case 
will determine the number of experts required, the attorney should coordinate the 
evaluation process to prevent duplicity of services and unnecessary costs to the 
client.  The expert may be called upon to testify before a jury; therefore, the attorney 
should select experts who have professional demeanors and are able to explain the 
elements of their analysis succinctly and in layman‟s terms.  Experts should provide 
not only written reports, but also photographs, plats, maps, charts, before and after 
comparisons, and the condemning authority‟s plans in their testimony. 
 A client may seek to settle disputes through alternative dispute resolution to 
avoid incurring the expense of hiring experts.  Given the continuous increase in costs 
and delays in litigation, more parties are turning to mediation, judicial settlement 
conferences, mini-trials, and arbitrations to resolve their differences.  These 
alternative avenues have many advantages aside from reduced costs, including 
speedier results, client empowerment, and realistic evaluation of the case by a neutral 
intermediary.  Alternative dispute resolution avenues remove some of the 
unpredictability associated with judges and juries and may save both parties 
significant expense and time.  If the parties settle outside of court, the settlement 
agreement should mirror a final judgment order, properly identifying the parties, the 
details of the property, rights acquired, and the just compensation paid. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, eminent domain practice is a mainstay of legal business in 
Tennessee and practitioners should be prepared to protect the rights of property 
owner and the public in condemnation actions.  Given Tennessee‟s explosive growth 
over the past decade, it will be imperative that government and private property 
owners work together to effectively manage that growth while protecting the rights 
of its citizens.  
 
                                                 
442 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-1004 (2007). 
443 COPE & MURPHY, supra note 439, at 39. 
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VI.  SAMPLE PLEADINGS, PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS, AND LEASE CLAUSES 
SAMPLE LEASE CLAUSE444 
__ CONDEMNATION. Rights and duties in the event of condemnation [are] as 
follows: 
 
(a) If the whole of the leased premises shall be taken or condemned by any 
competent authority for any public or quasi-public use or purpose, this Lease shall 
cease and terminate as of the date on which title shall vest thereby in that authority, 
and the rent reserved hereunder shall be apportioned and paid up to that date. 
(b) If only a portion of the leased premises shall be taken or condemned, this Lease 
and the term hereof shall not cease or terminate, but the rent payable after the date 
on which the LESSEE shall be required to surrender possession of such portion 
shall be reduced in proportion to the decreased use suffered by the LESSEE as the 
parties may agree or as shall be determined by arbitration. 
(c) In the event of any taking or condemnation in whole or in part, the entire 
resulting award of consequential damages shall be negotiated separately by LESSOR 
and LESSEE with the taking entity for their respective losses. 
(d) In case of any governmental action resulting in the taking or condemnation of 
any portion of the leased premises but creating a right to compensation therefor, or 
if less than a fee title to all or any portion of the leased premises shall be taken or 
condemned by any governmental authority for temporary use or occupancy, this 
Lease shall continue in full force and effect without reduction or abatement of rent, 
and the rights of the parties shall be unaffected by the other provisions of this 
section, but shall be governed by applicable law. 
 
 
 
                                                 
444 The sample lease clause that follows was taken from M & M Prop. v. Maples, No. 03A01-9705-
CH-00171, 1998 WL 29974, at *15-16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1998). 
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SAMPLE NOTICE445 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR [insert county], TENNESSEE 
 
AT [insert city/town] 
 
 
[Insert condemning authority]   ) 
) 
Petitioner,    ) 
) 
v.      ) No. _________ 
) 
[Insert all persons owning   )      
an interest in the target property],  ) 
) 
 Respondents.    ) 
) 
 
 
NOTICE 
 
 
  Please take notice that on [insert date], Petitioner [specify 
condemning authority] filed an eminent domain petition against you pursuant to 
Tennessee Code Annotated section [specify provisions] seeking to condemn 
property rights you own in [specify property], which is fully described in the petition, 
a copy of which accompanies this notice.  
  You must plead, answer, or except to the petition according to the 
provisions of the applicable Tennessee law, or a judgment will be taken as confessed 
against you and the matter proceeded with as provided by law.  
  You are further notified that after the expiration of thirty (30) days 
from the date of the giving of this notice, if you do not challenge the petitioner‟s 
right to condemn the property rights described in the petition in accordance with the 
applicable Tennessee law, the petitioner shall have the right to take possession of the 
property rights sought to be condemned; and if necessary to place the petitioner in 
                                                 
445 This sample Notice was adapted from COPE & MURPHY, supra note 439, at 48-49 and MURPHY, 
supra note 152, at 37. 
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possession of those sought after rights, the Court shall issue a Writ of Possession to 
the Sheriff of the County to the petitioner in possession. Furthermore, the Court 
shall enter an Order of Taking granting the petitioner possession of the sought after 
property rights. 
 
  This the ____ day of ___________, [year]. 
 
 
       CIRCUIT COURT CLERK 
 
 
      BY: __________________________ 
 
OFFICER‟S RETURN 
  I certify that I served this Notice along with a copy of the petition for 
condemnation, upon the above named respondent(s), by personally delivering a copy 
to him or her this ___ day of _________, [year]. 
 
           
      BY:__________________________ 
 
 
 
2007]                              CHANGING WITH THE TIMES:                                                239 
EMINENT DOMAIN PRACTICE IN LIGHT OF TENNESSEE PUBLIC ACT 863       
 
SAMPLE MOTION FOR NOTICE BY PUBLICATION446 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR [insert county], TENNESSEE 
 
AT [insert city/town] 
 
 
[Insert condemning authority]  ) 
) 
Petitioner,   ) 
) 
v.     ) No. _________ 
) 
[Insert all persons owning  )      
an interest in the target property] ) 
) 
 Respondents.   ) 
) 
 
 
MOTION FOR NOTICE BY PUBLICATION 
 
 
  Comes now the Petitioner, by and through counsel, and respectfully 
moves this Court pursuant to Rule 4.05 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-16-105 and 21-1-103, for an Order that 
notice of condemnation petition filed with this Court upon respondents [specify all 
property owners], be made by publication and for grounds states that the residence 
of these respondents is unknown and cannot be ascertained upon diligent inquiry. 
Petitioner relies on the affidavit of its counsel of record, [insert counsel], filed with 
this motion in support of same.  
 
        
                                                 
446 This sample Motion for Notice by Publication was adapted from MURPHY, supra note 152, at 41. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
           
                   __________________ 
       Counsel for Petitioner 
       [insert contact information]  
 
 
SAMPLE CONDEMNATION PETITION447 
 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR [insert county], TENNESSEE 
 
AT [insert city/town] 
 
 
[Insert condemning authority]  ) 
) 
Petitioner,   ) 
) 
v.     ) No. _________ 
) 
[Insert all persons owning  )      
an interest in the target property] ) 
) 
 Respondents.   ) 
) 
 
 
PETITION 
 
 
   
                                                 
447 This sample Condemnation Petition was adapted from COPE & MURPHY, supra note 439, at 50-53 
and MURPHY, supra note 152, at 35-36.   
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  Petitioner, [insert condemning authority] respectfully shows to the 
Court as follows: 
 
1. [Identify condemning authority, including its character and function] 
 
2. [Specify condemnation enabling statute or provision, which expressly  
grants the condemning authority the power of eminent domain] 
 
3. [Name all the defendant property owners and identify the appropriate  
civil district where the targeted property is located, the sought after property rights, 
and the legal description of the targeted property. Indicate that property map has 
been attached as an exhibit] 
 
4. [List any encumbrances, if any] 
 
5. [Specify the public use or purpose for which the targeted property 
will be used] 
 
6. [Specify that the condemnation is essential and necessary and that the 
condemning authority should be allowed to enter the property to effectuate the 
public use or purpose] 
 
7. [Indicate the amount the condemning authority has deposited with  
the clerk of the court and specify that the condemning authority has acquired the 
requisite appraisal] 
 
8. [If the jury of view method is sought, indicate that the condemning  
authority has filed the petition for the purpose of obtaining the issuance of a writ of 
inquiry of damages and the appointment of a jury of view] 
 
9. [Averment that condemning authority is entitled to the targeted  
property or right sought] 
 
PREMISED CONSIDERED, Petitioner prays: 
 
1. That a copy of this petition issue and be served upon the defendants  
and that they be required to answer same as provided by law, but their oath to 
answer is specifically waived. 
 
2. That pursuant to law, after thirty (30) days from service of Notice, if  
defendants do not contest the petitioner‟s right to condemn the sought after 
property or property rights, that  
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an Order by granted granting the petitioner the right of possession of the property 
described within this petition. 
 
3. That the Court grant all necessary Orders, including a Writ of  
Possession as may be required. 
 
4. That all proper proceedings be had hereunder which are necessary  
for the condemnation and appropriation of the property described within this 
petition. 
 
5. That the previously mentioned deposit be distributed according to  
the law. 
 
6. That all necessary and proper proceedings be had hereunder and that  
the same be decreed to the petitioner at the final hearing. 
 
 7. That petitioner have a jury of twelve to try this case. 
 
8. That the petitioner have such other, further and general relief as it  
may be entitled to under the facts and law of this case. 
 
 
       Respectfully submitted, 
 
       [Law firm] 
           
      BY:__________________________ 
       [Attorney] 
       Counsel for Petitioner 
       [Address] 
 
 
 
COST BOND 
 
(Requirements vary by jurisdiction.) 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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SAMPLE TENDER448 
 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR [insert county], TENNESSEE 
 
AT [insert city/town] 
 
 
[Insert condemning authority]   ) 
) 
Petitioner,    ) 
) 
v.      ) No. _________ 
) 
[Insert all persons owning   )      
an interest in the target property]  ) 
) 
 Respondents.    ) 
) 
 
 
TENDER 
 
 
Petitioner has filed a petition to condemn certain rights in the Circuit 
Court of this  
County. 
 
  Pursuant to law, petitioner tenders to the Clerk of the Circuit Court 
that amount of [indicated amount deposited], which has been determined by the 
petitioner as the damages to which the defendants are entitled to after obtaining the 
requisite appraisal.  
 
  This ___ day of ___________, [year]. 
 
 
                                                 
448 This sample Tender was adapted from COPE & MURPHY, supra note 439, at 54. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
 
        [Law firm] 
      
 BY:__________________________ 
       [Attorney] 
       Counsel for Petitioner 
       [Address] 
 
 
SAMPLE ANSWER449 
 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR [insert county], TENNESSEE 
 
AT [insert city/town] 
 
 
[Insert condemning authority]   ) 
) 
Petitioner,    ) 
) 
v.      ) No. _________ 
) 
[Insert all persons owning   )      
an interest in the target property]  ) 
) 
 Respondents.    ) 
) 
 
 
ANSWER 
 
 
 Comes now the defendant property owners, [insert name], and states: 
 
[Answer each paragraph as necessary] 
 
                                                 
449 This sample Answer was adapted from COPE & MURPHY, supra note 439, at 56-57. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
 
       [Law firm] 
 
           
      BY:__________________________ 
       [Attorney] 
       Counsel for Petitioner 
       [Address] 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 
SAMPLE INTERROGATORIES450 
 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR [insert county], TENNESSEE 
 
AT [insert city/town] 
 
 
[Insert condemning authority]   ) 
) 
Petitioner,    ) 
) 
v.      ) No. _________ 
) 
[Insert all persons owning   )      
an interest in the target property]  ) 
) 
 Respondents.    ) 
) 
 
 
PETITIONER’S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
 
 
                                                 
450 This sample Interrogatories was adapted from COPE & MURPHY, supra note 439, at 59-76.  
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Petitioner, [insert condemning authority], pursuant to Rules 26 and 34 of the 
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, submits the following First Set of 
Interrogatories to the Defendants, [insert property owner defendants], as follows: 
INSTRUCTIONS 
[Include traditional instructions] 
DEFINITIONS 
[Include traditional definitions] 
“Petition” means the Petition filed herein and any amendments or 
supplements thereto. 
“Property” means real estate and all related improvements, fixtures, etc. 
“Subject property” refers to the entire parcel of land and all improvements in 
which the defendants claim an interest and from which the petitioner seeks to 
condemn through the power of eminent domain. 
“Residue” means any portion of the Subject Property remaining, if any, after 
the petitioner takes possession of the Property it seeks to condemn in this petition.  
“Property taken” refers to the portion of the Subject Property sought to be 
condemned in this petition. 
“Improvement” refers to any fixtures, chattel, structure, or other thing found 
attached to the Property, which may be considered to have value.  
“Incidental damages” means any claims of compensation beyond the claim 
for payment for the Property taken. 
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INTERROGATORIES 
[Include traditional background interrogatories] 
Possible topics for discovery include: 
 
- How did the property owners became familiar with the subject property 
and any improvements? 
 
- Have the property owners identify all the uses, which they have used or 
known the property to be used? 
 
- Have the property owner identify any previous owners or other who may 
own an interest in the subject property, including interest owned, dates 
owned, selling prices, and contact information? 
 
- Identify any discussions or communications about selling the subject 
property, including the parties involved, dates, times, locations, nature of 
the discussion, prices, etc. 
 
- What is the subject property‟s best and highest use, including any basis 
for the answer? 
 
- If the property owner was not putting the subject property to its best or 
highest use, discover why not, including justifications. 
 
- Has there been any prior appraisals performed on the property? If so, 
identify who performed it, when was it performed, what was the 
determination, and how to contact the appraiser? 
 
- Has the subject property ever been surveyed? If so, identify the surveyor, 
when it was performed, where is the survey, and how to contact the 
surveyor? 
 
- Will the condemnation cause any adverse effects to the residue? If so, 
what is the basis for that conclusion?  
 
- Have the property owner identify what he or she believes is the fair 
market value of the subject property and why. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
       
[Law firm] 
           
      BY:__________________________ 
       [Attorney] 
       Counsel for Petitioner 
       [Address] 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
